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  Clinical research in pregnant women is controversial, so much so that is almost 
universally avoided by the pharmaceutical industry and heavily restricted by the Department of 
Health and Human Services in the regulations governing IRB approval of clinical studies.  Many 
would argue that the risks to the fetus justify pregnant women’s restricted access to clinical drug.  
I respond that these perceived risks are the result of misplaced, exaggerated fears about drug 
safety, tort liability, and speculative concerns about pregnant women’s potent conflicts of interest 
with their fetus.  I further assert that for the vast majority of pregnant women who do use 
medications during pregnancy, the psychological and medical consequences of not knowing 
whether their medications are safe and effective are far worse than the hazards of allowing those 
women to participate freely in clinical trials.  
  Section I of this paper identifies the problem of women’s present inability to make 
informed decisions about medication during pregnancy, and the need for clinical drug testing to 
rectify that problem.   
  Section II argues that the current predominant method of assessing drug safety for 
pregnant women and their fetuses via post-market registries is inadequate, and advocates for 
clinical trials instead.   
  Section III outlines the history government regulation of pregnant women’s drug-use and 
other medical decisions and the discriminatory assumptions inherent about women that are 
conveyed through the government’s actions.  I then discuss the Department of Health and 
Human Services regulation on pregnant women’s participation in clinical research.  I critique the 
government’s restrictive approach on a policy level and also through a constitutional law lens.  I 3 
 
conclude that on a policy level, the current regulations inappropriately perpetuate stereotypes 
that pregnant women are irresponsible, mentally unsound, incapable of acting in their and their 
child’s best interests, and otherwise in special need of paternalistic restrictions on their freedom.  
On the constitutional question, I conclude that while a Due Process challenge to the legislation is 
unlikely to prevail, there is a considerable possibility that the regulations could be held to violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.   
  Section IV provides a counterargument to industry claims that clinical research in 
pregnant subjects is impracticable because of the threat of litigation.  I respond that under current 
tort law, the industry faces far greater exposure to liability than they would have if they 
conducted research on pregnancy safety, because their routine failure to conduct adequate 
experimentation in pregnant women can give rise to strict liability for their failure to warn and 
failure to test. 
  Section V proposes and compares various legal mechanisms and incentives that may 
accomplish better industry inclusion of pregnant women in clinical trials.  The three mechanisms 
I examine are government-run or subsidized studies, FDA labeling requirements, or outright 









I.  The Problem of Inadequate Drug Safety Information for Pregnant Women 
  Less than 1% of drugs listed in the Physicians Desk Reference, the go-to source for 
prescribing information for many doctors, have been found safe after testing in pregnant 
women.
1  This means that for more than 99% of drugs, women lack the basic clinically-proven 
safety assurances that men enjoy for all FDA approved drugs.  Once you factor in animal testing 
and post-market data, the information available proves, but only slightly; we still lack adequate 
information to determine the safety for use in pregnancy of 91% of drugs approved by the FDA.
2  
Of the limited information that we do know, almost all of it comes from data assembled after a 
drug has been approved by the FDA and after it has entered the market.
3  
  This dearth of information would be less shocking if drug use by pregnant women were 
less ubiquitous.  Each year, 10% of women between the ages of 15 and 44 in the United States 
become pregnant.
4  Of those women, 60% will use a prescription medication and 93% will use 
an over-the-counter medication during pregnancy.
5  With so many pregnant women taking 
therapeutic drugs during pregnancy, it is astonishing to learn that so few of those drugs contain 
the safety information pregnant women need to make an informed choice about their medical 
treatment.  If scientific information about the health risks of medications in pregnancy were 
                                                 
1 Rita Rubin, Pregnant with Fears Drug Registries Help Women Stay Informed, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 21, 2000, at A1. 
2 DAWN A. MARCUS & PHILIP A. BAIN, EFFECTIVE MIGRAINE TREATMENT IN PREGNANT AND 
LACTATING WOMEN: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 35 (2009). 
3 Caitlin S. Buhimschi & Carl P. Weiner, Medications in Pregnancy and Lactation: Part 1. 
Teratology, 113 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 166, 168 (2009); cf. PETER RUBIN & MARGARET 
RAMSAY, PRESCRIBING IN PREGNANCY 2 (4th ed. 2008) (50% of pregnant women will use a 
prescription medication other than prescribed vitamins or dietary supplements). 
4 U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CTR. DRUG EVAL. RES. 
(CDER), GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ESTABLISHING PREGNANCY 
EXPOSURE REGISTRIES 5 (2002). 
5 MARCUS & BAIN, supra note 2, at 30; compare MIKE SAMUELS & NANCY SAMUELS, NEW WELL 
PREGNANCY BOOK 134 (1996) (in Scotland, 97% of pregnant women take prescription drugs at 
some point during their pregnancy and 65% take over-the-counter drugs). 5 
 
available, it is likely even more pregnant women would use even more drugs.  Pregnant women 
routinely abstain from taking new medications during pregnancy because of the potential for 
unknown risks to the fetus, no matter how those drugs are needed to treat or ameliorate the 
pregnant women’s medical conditions.  Women also cease taking their existing medications for 
chronic medications like allergy or hypertension drugs, and women endure diseases they 
encounter during pregnancy without antibiotics or pain relievers.
6.  
  As one FDA spokesperson put it: “Pregnant women are actually the last orphans when it 
comes to drug information.”
7  I would go further than this and contend that all women who could 
become pregnant are orphaned by the lack information available on drug effects in pregnancy. 
Adding to the problem is the fact that at least half of all pregnancies are unplanned.
8  Many 
women inadvertently expose their fetus to drugs that they were using before they realized that 
they were pregnant.
9  Consequently, nonpregnant women also need information about the 
pregnancy risks of their medications so they can decide whether they need to take added 
precautions to avoid becoming pregnant while using the drug.  
  Without knowledge about whether a particular medication is safe for use in pregnancy, a 
woman who has inadvertently taken the drug in the first weeks of her pregnancy is faced with 
terrifying uncertainty.  She may decide to terminate the pregnancy to avoid to possibility of birth 
                                                 
6 Even ibuprofen and other common NSAIDs which are provided over the counter have been 
shown to cause fetal kidney failure and heart abnormalities if taken in the later stages of 
pregnancy.  Buhimschi & Weiner, supra note 3, at 168. 
7 Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Ending Guesswork on Drugs in Pregnancy; FDA Seeks Better Safety 
Data for Women and Their Doctors, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2002, at F1. 
8 CDER, PREGNANCY REGISTRIES, supra note 4, at 5. 
9 U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CTR. DRUG EVAL. RES. 
(CDER), REVIEWER GUIDANCE: EVALUATING THE RISK OF DRUG EXPOSURE IN HUMAN 
PREGNANCIES 3 (2005). 6 
 
defects, which in turn can cause unnecessary emotional trauma if the drug is in fact safe.
 10  If she 
continues the pregnancy, her lack of knowledge can cause her undue worry and stress even if the 
drug ultimately proves safe.
11  This stress can be significant; one study found that hearing that a 
drug taken while pregnant could be unsafe caused higher levels of stress in pregnant women than 
a major financial crisis, being sued, sexual dysfunction, premature delivery, hospitalization 
lasting over a month, or their husband/partner becoming unemployed over the course of the 
pregnancy.
12  Other studies have shown that stress itself is a teratogen, that is, a substance that 
irreversibly alters the growth, structure, or function of a gestating embryo or fetus.
 13  Women 
who experience elevated levels of stress during pregnancy are more likely to have underweight 
and premature babies, and those infants are more likely to be born with physiological 
malformations such as heart defects and cleft lip or cleft palate disorders.
14 
  The frequent uncertainty about drugs’ teratogenic potential has led to widespread 
overestimation of the risks.
15  One study surveying pregnant women found that, on average, they 
estimated the risk of major birth defects for certain non-teratogenic drugs to be 24%—
approximately the same risk as Thalidomide.
16  Compounding the problem, the heavily-
publicized teratogens Thalidomide and DES caused limb malformations and cancer, two of the 
most severe kinds of birth defects that can result from maternal drug use.  This creates the false 
                                                 
10 MARCUS & BAIN, supra note 2, at 32; see also Toby L. Schonfeld et al., iPLEDGE Allegiance 
to the Pill: Evaluation of Year 1 of a Birth Defect Prevention and Monitoring System, 37 J. L. 
MED. & ETHICS 104, 109 (2009). 
11 Id. (“unfounded patient fears and stress may result in substantial maternal stress and anxiety 
and even consideration of pregnancy termination”). 
12 SAMUELS & SAMUELS, supra note 5, at 147–48. 
13 Buhimschi & Weiner, supra note 3, at 167. 
14 MARCUS & BAIN, supra note 2, at 32. 
15 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF 
INCLUDING WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES VOLUME 1 182 (Anna C. Mastroianni, Ruth Faden, and 
Daniel Federman eds., 1994). 
16 CDER, EVALUATING THE RISK, supra note 9, at 3. 7 
 
perception not only that drug teratogenicy is common, but that teratogens cause devastating harm 
to the developing fetus.  Yet or the vast majority of known teratogens the effects are usually 
minor, such as low birth weight or preterm delivery, which are common disorders
17 unlikely to 
have any long-term effects on a child’s development.  Not all drugs even cross the placenta, and 
for many that do, the placenta filters out much of the drug so that the fetus is only exposed to a 
vastly reduced dose of the medication.
 18  Thus when a pregnant women takes a drug, it does not 
necessarily mean that the drug will ever enter the fetus’ bloodstream.  Nevertheless, the myth 
drugs are always incredibly dangerous during pregnancy is pervasive in our society.   
  The tragic consequence overestimating drug risk during pregnancy is that many women 
are unnecessarily discouraged from taking safe medicines that would benefit them.  Many 
doctors specifically counsel women to avoid taking all medications during pregnancy unless 
absolutely necessary.
19  On top of this many drug labels expressly warn women to stop taking the 
drug if they become pregnant even where there is no indication that the drug has any teratogenic 
potential.
20  Drug companies include these unfounded warnings as a precaution to shield 
themselves from lawsuits, but the warnings can cause pregnant women who read them to 
needlessly avoid safe medications.   
  The FDA even requires that for any over-the-counter drug that is absorbed systemically, 
even if it is proven safe for pregnancy, the label must warn in bold type, “If pregnant or 
                                                 
17 Low birth rate occurs in one out of every twelve births and pre-term labor occurs in one of 
eight.  CDER, EVALUATING THE RISK, supra note 9, at 4. 
18 See Caitlin S. Buhimschi & Carl P. Weiner, Medications in Pregnancy and Lactation: Part 2. 
Drugs with Minimal or Unknown Human Teratogenic Effect, 113 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
417, 423–24, 428 (2009) (noting that less than 10% of certain antibiotics, asthma medication and 
corticosteroids cross the placenta). 
19 SAMUELS & SAMUELS, supra note 5, at 136; Rubin, supra note 1, at A1. 
20 Rubin, supra note 1, at A1; see also Buhimschi & Weiner, supra note 188, at 427 
(commenting that the allergy medicine, Zyrtec, claims on its label that it should not be used in 
pregnancy because it is unsafe for the fetus even though human studies indicate that it is safe).   8 
 
breastfeeding, ask a healthcare professional before use.”
21  Although this does not warn of 
any specific danger to the woman of her fetus, it does imply that there is some cause for concern 
about the drug’s safety.  At a minimum this causes pregnant women to incur the added burden 
and expense of arranging a doctor’s visit to use an over-the-counter medication, something that 
no nonpregnant individual ever has to do.  At worst it can cause so much undue fear that women 
will avoid taking the medication altogether.  In essence, the labeling requirement transforms an 
over-the-counter medicine into a prescription medicine for pregnant women, depriving them of 
the convenience and expectations of safety that all other adults enjoy for over-the-counter 
treatments.   
  A woman with a dangerous condition during pregnancy has a terrible choice between 
forgoing treatment, taking a drug with known teratogenic effects, or experimenting on herself 
and her fetus with drugs for which no human data is available.  Although animal data might 
inform her decision, experts routinely stress that animal data is particularly unreliable as a 
predictor of human fetal risk.
22  Consequently, favorable animal data might induce a woman to 
try a drug, only to find out later her fetus has been harmed.  The inverse is also true: evidence of 
teratogenic effects in animals might deter a woman even though human studies, if conducted, 
would show that the drug is safe for human pregnancies.  The latter is especially likely, given 
                                                 
21 21 C.F.R. § 201.63(a). 
22 See, e.g., Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for Failure 
to Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits from Driving Good Drugs Off 
the Market, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413, 435 (1990) (observing that extensive animal testing of 
Thalidomide in high doses did not reveal any teratogenic potential even though a single dose in 
humans can cause birth defects, and that other drugs are teratogenic in animals but not in 
humans);  Bernard A. Schwetz et al., Monitoring Problems in Teratology, in SCIENTIFIC 
CONSIDERATIONS IN MONITORING AND EVALUATION TOXICOLOGICAL RESEARCH 179, 179 (E. 
Gralla ed. 1981) (“[e]xtrapolation from animal data to humans is difficult with the best of data 
and is very risky with poor data."). 9 
 
that women are so vehemently discouraged from taking drugs by their doctors and the drug 
company’s labels.  
  The dangers for women who forgo taking drugs to treat their medical conditions while 
pregnant are very real.  While taking drugs can potentially harm a fetus, not taking needed drugs 
will almost certainly harm the mother.
23  Consider, for example, mental illness during pregnancy.  
Approximately 500,000 pregnant women each year are diagnosed a form of mental illness.
 24  
More than two thirds of pregnant women exhibit symptoms of depression, and one third of 
pregnant women will take a psychiatric medication at some point during their pregnancy.
25  The 
high prevalence of psychiatric conditions during pregnancy is unsurprising, given that women 
are twice as likely as men to experience depression.
26  
  Pregnant women with depression and bipolar disorders experience an increased incidence 
of low birth weights, inconsolable crying once the baby is born, and postnatal complications that 
result in hospitalization of the infant.
27  Depression in pregnant women is also correlated with 
increased stress levels, excessive weight gain, smoking, and alcohol and drug use, all of which 
harm the fetus independent of the mental disease’s direct effects.
28  In the long-term, children of 
women whose depression was untreated during pregnancy are more likely to develop psychiatric 
problems of their own, including suicide, than children whose mothers took medication for their 
                                                 
23 Susan Epstein, Tort Reform to Ensure the Inclusion of Fertile Women in Early Phases of 
Commercial Drug Research, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 355, 365 (1996). 
24 Am. Congress Obstetricians & Gynecologists, ACOG Practice Bulletin: Use of Psychiatric 
Medications During Pregnancy and Lactation, 92 CLINICAL MGMT. GUIDELINES FOR 
OBSTETRICIAN-GYNECOLOGISTS 1, 1 (Apr. 2008). 
25 Id. at 5. 
26 Id. at 4. 
27 Am. Congress Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 24, at 2, 5. 
28 Am Congress Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 24, at 5. 10 
 
illness.
29  Even mild anxiety disorders produce increased rates of fetal distress, miscarriage, 
preterm delivery, forceps deliveries, and slowed mental development in the child for years after 
birth.
30  Schizophrenia causes all of the above, plus an increased risk of maternal hemorrhaging 
and unexplained infant death.
31  Fetal risk aside, untreated mental can seriously harm the mother.  
In one especially tragic case, a woman who chose to forgo her anti-depressant regimen during 
pregnancy and breastfeeding because of uncertainty about the drug’s safety threw herself and her 
newborn baby in front of a train.
32  While it may be tempting to dismiss this as a rare occurrence, 
suicide is the leading cause of maternal death in the United Kingdom, accounting for 15% of all 
maternal deaths.
33  On top of all of this, a woman who suffers from mental illness and stops 
taking her medication during pregnancy must cope with experiencing the mental disease itself, 
which is no small burden to bear. 
  Yet in spite of the dangers of prevalence of mental disease in pregnancy, approximately 
70% of psychiatric medications are still classified as Category B or C drugs by the FDA,
34 
meaning there are “no adequate or well-controlled studies in pregnant women.”
35  The remaining 
30% of psychiatric drugs are all category D or X drugs, meaning that either human studies or 
                                                 
29 Id. at 6. 
30 Id. at 2, 6. 
31 Id. 
32 Kritz, supra note 7, at F1. 
33 RUBIN & RAMSAY, supra note 3, at 115. 
34 See id. at 2–4. 
35 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(9)(i).  The FDA currently categorizes drugs into one of five groups 
based on pregnancy risk.  Category A drugs have been shown by adequate human studies to have 
no demonstrated risk to the fetus.  Category B drugs are drugs for which animal studies fail to 
demonstrate a risk, but for which there are no adequate or well-controlled human studies.  
Category C drugs are drugs for which animal studies suggest a possible risk to the fetus, but for 
which there are no adequate or well-controlled human studies.  Category D drugs are drugs for 
which post-market use in humans or human studies have demonstrated fetal risk, but the benefits 
of the drug outweigh those risks.  Category X drugs are drugs for which post-market use in 
humans or human studies have demonstrated fetal risk, and the benefits of the drug do not 
outweigh those risks.  Id. 11 
 
post-market use by humans have revealed that the drug poses teratogenic risks to the fetus.
36  
Thus despite the overwhelming prevalence of mental disease in pregnant women, pregnant 
women have no options that they know are safe.  Either they must take a dangerous drug, take no 
drug at all and suffer from their illness, or try a category B or C drug without knowing whether 
or not it is safe. 
  Asthma is another common disease that can have terrible effects of a woman and her 
fetus if she refuses medication with uncertain pregnancy risk.  Women with asthma are more 
likely to develop pregnancy-related hypertension and gestational diabetes.
37  Offspring of women 
with diabetes are five times more likely to be stillborn and three times as likely to die within the 
first month after birth.
38  Diabetes also doubles the risk of major birth defects.
39  Asthma is also 
especially treacherous in pregnancy because women require 20% more oxygen than they do 
when not pregnant, and asthma attacks can deprive a fetus of oxygen.
40  In spite of this, one 
doctor observed that: “Many asthmatics experience worsening of their symptoms during 
pregnancy simply because they have stopped or reduced their usual medications due to fears 
(their own or those of their doctors) about their safety.”
41 
  For other conditions, like epilepsy, ceasing medication during pregnancy is not an option.  
Even a single grand mal seizure can cause a miscarriage.
42  Seizures can also cause a woman to 
fall or have a car accident, posing additional serious risks for grave harm.
43  Anti-viral 
                                                 
36 Am Congress Obstetricians & Gynecologists, supra note 24, at 2–4. 
37 RUBIN & RAMSAY, supra note 3, at 170. 
38 Id. at 150. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 169. 
41 Id. at 170. 
42 Patricia Guthrie, Medicine and pregnancy risk: Seeking answers, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Dec. 10, 2002, at C1. 
43 SAMUELS & SAMUELS, supra note 5, at 126–27; Rubin, supra note 1, at A1. 12 
 
medications used to treat AIDS are also absolutely necessary to prevent disease progression in 
the mother and can at the same time significantly reduce the chances of transmitting HIV to the 
fetus.  
  Moreover pregnancy can often give rise to the very conditions that require treatment or 
exacerbate preexisting medical conditions.  Many women develop cardiovascular disease for the 
first time in pregnancy.
44  This can occur either because of pregnancy-specific conditions like 
pre-eclampsia, or because changes in the woman’s body such as increased blood pressure can 
precipitate the onset of cardiovascular illness.
45  Pregnancy also increases the likelihood of 
urinary tract infections, which in turn cause premature labor and low birth weight.
46  
Additionally, digestive problems like constipation, diarrhea, acid reflux, and heartburn are 
commonly more frequent during pregnancy, and can all cause adverse effects on the fetal 
development.
47  For instance, diarrhea and vomiting cause dehydration that reduces amniotic 
fluid, which leads to preterm labor and limb deformities.
48  Vomiting also disrupts the pregnant 
woman’s daily life; over half of employed pregnant women have to take off time from work due 
to morning sickness, and almost all were unable to cook food for themselves and/or their 
families
49. 
  While it is true that testing drugs with unknown pregnancy risk in clinical trial subjects 
could put their fetuses at risk, the truth is that fetuses are already experiencing the same risk on 
an incredibly widespread scale, without any of the benefits of monitoring and guidance that 
                                                 
44 RUBIN & RAMSAY, supra note 3, at 77. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 36, 48–49. 
47 Id. at 17–23. 
48 See id. 
49 Caroline Smith et al., The Impact of Nausea and Vomiting on Women: A Burden in Early 
Pregnancy, 40 AUST. & NEW ZEALAND J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 397,399–400 (2000) 13 
 
come from supervision in a clinical trial setting.  Women who take drugs without having 
adequate knowledge of their safety are forced to gamble with their health and with the health of 
their fetus.  They become their own researchers and their own research subjects.  And as Dr. 
Sandy Kweder, former co-chairwoman  of the FDA’s pregnancy labeling task force once said, 
"It's wrong for every patient to be her own experiment."
50  
  Also, for many of the drugs for which we lack adequate safety information, no animal 
teratology studies were conducted.  If animal tests or in vitro studies on embryos are conducted 
as a prerequisite for human trials, we would have much better guidance as to whether those drugs 
are safe enough to test in a clinical population of pregnant woman.  We can further gain some 
sense of the potential fetal risks of a new drug by comparing the drug’s chemical structure to 
known teratogens.
51   
  Furthermore, there is also strong evidence to suggest that the average risk of fetal effects 
among most drugs is fairly small.  Only 3–5% of all pregnancies currently result in birth defects 
despite widespread use of prescription and nonprescription use of medications by pregnant 
women.
52  Of the 3–5% of children born birth defects, only 1% have abnormalities that are 
attributed to drugs taken during pregnancy.
53  It cannot rightly be said that testing drugs in 
pregnant women is too inherently dangerous to fetus to be ethically justified, when all evidence 
indicates that the risk of serious birth defects from medications is extremely minute. 
                                                 
50 Marilyn Kennedy Melia, A New RX for Healthier Pregnancies, CHI. TRIBUNE, Jan 21, 2004, at 
C1. 
51 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 184–85.  This is a proven method in other 
contexts, as researchers frequently perform structural comparisons of new drugs to known 
carcinogens to predict potential cancer risk before testing the drug in a clinical population.  Id. at 
185. 
52 See, e.g., Janice K. Bush, The Industry Perspective on the Inclusion of Women in Clinical 
Trials, 69 ACAD. MED. 708, 710 (1994). 
53 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 178; SAMUELS & SAMUELS, supra note 5, at 124–
25. 14 
 
  Finally, even if information is available about the safety of a particular drug for use in 
pregnant women, there may be no way for a woman and her doctor to assess its effectiveness at 
the recommended dose.  The recommended dose for a drug in nonpregnant adults may differ 
from a pregnant woman’s needs.  Pregnancy changes a woman’s blood flow, blood oxygen 
content, body fat composition, water content and overall weight, all of which can affect how 
drugs are absorbed by a pregnant woman’s body.
54  The placenta has also been shown to 
interfere with the rate that a drug is metabolized by the pregnant woman.
55  This could be 
because the drugs are being metabolized by the fetus, or it could be that the placenta, which 
averages two pounds in weight, is absorbing the medicine like any other organ.
56  Together these 
changes can render the standard dose for the drug either ineffective or an overdose.  For 
example, one study found that the concentration of ampicillin, a common antibiotic, in pregnant 
women’s bloodstreams was half the amount in nonpregnant persons who were given the same 
dose of the drug.
57  Without tailored studies in pregnant woman, dosing information available to 
doctors may be meaningless as applied to a pregnant patient.  Just as children need tailored 
dosing because of their size,
58 pregnant adults have physiological differences that also 
necessitate targeted studies to determine the appropriate dose of any given medication. 
  Opponents of pregnancy testing argue that pregnancy is not the only factor that can 
generate differences in the safety and effectiveness of drugs.
59  Race, blood type, diet, physical 
                                                 
54 U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CTR. DRUG EVAL. RES. 
(CDER), GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:  PHARMOKINETICS IN PREGNANCY—STUDY DESIGN, DATA 
ANALYSIS, AND IMPACT ON DOSING AND LABELING 3 (2004). 
55 Guthrie, supra note 42, at C1. 
56 Id. 
57 RUBIN & RAMSAY, supra note 3, at 37. 
58 See EVAN DERENZO & JOEL MOSS, WRITING CLINICAL RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: ETHICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 80 (2006) 
59 Bush, supra note 52, at 709. 15 
 
fitness, nutrition, psychological factors, medical history and other factors can all have an effect 
on a drug’s safety and effectiveness, just as pregnancy can.
60  In order to achieve a truly 
representative clinical trial population and ensure that a particular drug is safe and effective in all 
persons, you would have to test the drug in test subjects that exhibit variation in all of the 
aforementioned factors.  As one industry spokesperson put it, “[c]learly, pharmaceutical firms 
cannot test for every one of these [factors] before a drug is marketed.”
 61   
  Yet pregnancy is different from these other variables.  Because there are unlimited 
possible variations in diet, you would need to test in as many different research as there are 
different possible diets.  Pregnancy on the other hand causes predictable, consistent differences 
in body structure and function that can be extrapolated from a small test subject group to the 
entire class of pregnant women.  Another reason pregnancy is different from other variables is 
that, a fetus exposed to a drug is at a uniquely critical stage in its physical development, meaning 
that drugs can have especially drastic and life-altering effects on organ formation that are 
unlikely to occur in a fully developed human being.  Furthermore, pregnancy is not a lifestyle 
choice like tobacco use, diet or exercise.  It a condition necessary for the survival of the human 
species.  The social importance of pregnancy sets it apart from other human behaviors and makes 
it especially deserving of reasonable accommodations by pharmaceutical companies to ensure 





                                                 
60 Id. at 711. 
61 Id. at 709.  16 
 
II.  The Inadequacy of Pregnancy Registries as a Substitute for Clinical Trials 
  Much of our available information on drug teratogenicity comes from pregnancy 
registries.
62  A pregnancy registry usually consists of a telephone hotline or web resource that 
pregnant women and obstetricians can access to report their pregnancy outcomes after using a 
drug.  A registry differs from clinical trials in significant ways, perhaps the most significant 
being that they only ever begin to gather data after a drug has been marketed to, purchased by, 
and used by pregnant women who had no way of knowing the drugs’ risks before taking them.  
Some would assert that the absence of clinical studies is not a real problem because registries and 
surveillance studies can substitute for traditional clinical trials in assessing drug safety.  I argue 
that registries have shortcomings compared to traditional clinical trials that render them largely 
unreliable and unhelpful as a source of information for pregnant women and their doctors. 
  Registries are typically operated by the individual drug’s manufacturers.
63  Some 
independent groups also conduct registries, but these are often oriented toward a particular 
medical condition rather than a particular drug.
64  The fact that drug manufacturers manage the 
registries for their own drugs creates an opportunity for bias to influence results.  Unlike 
controlled clinical trials conducted by manufacturers where any bias is largely offset by the 
oversight of FDA approval, registries are conducted voluntarily by drug manufacturers without 
any FDA input or minimum requirements for reliability.   
  One example of where the potential for bias and lack of oversight can cause misleading 
results is during the recruitment process.  Pharmaceutical companies may selectively recruit 
women whose preliminary testing (such as prenatal screening) detected no abnormalities in order 
                                                 
62 Buhimschi & Weiner, supra note 3, at 166. 
63 Id. at 168. 
64 Resources for Better Drug Safety Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2002, at F7. 17 
 
to artificially dilute any negative outcomes.
65  The FDA has discouraged this practice, but 
simultaneously made clear that its statements were not binding on the industry.
66  Another area 
where bias can come into place is on the question of when, if ever, registry data should be made 
public.  Registry data is routinely kept secret until the manufacturer concludes that the results are 
statistically solid.  Depending on rate at which women volunteer their information, this can take 
several years, or may never occur.
67  However, there are no set requirements for when, if ever, a 
registry operator must disclose the registry data, and thus manufacturers have an opportunity and 
an incentive to game the system.  If early reports to the registry are all positive, they can stop 
accepting volunteers and report the results promptly, even if a statistically significant sample size 
has not been reached, or if not enough follow-up has occurred to see if abnormalities emerged 
later in the pregnancy.  This early positive data will allow drug companies to gain pregnant 
customers.  On the flip side, if early reports are negative, the manufacturer can delay reporting 
the results for a long period of time or even indefinitely while they continue to profit from 
pregnant purchasers of the drug.   
  A further problem is with registries is that their existence is not required to be reported on 
drug labels, so doctors and women must proactively ferret out the information on a case by case 
basis.
68  Some registries post their results online, but others provide it only upon request.
69  Some 
will only send information to a qualified physician.
70  Although this may not pose an obstacle for 
some women, others will inevitably forgo obtaining the information rather than go through the 
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administrative hassle and expense of arranging separate appointment with their doctor to obtain 
the requested registry information once it arrives.   
  In cases where a patient does not know about a registry, it is up to the doctors to research 
registry information before prescribing a drug to a pregnant or pregnable woman.  Relying on 
individual doctors’ abilities to compile this scattered, often unpublished data for every drug is 
entirely impractical and unrealistic.  Even if the data from registries were reliable, which, for 
reasons discussed below, it is not, doctors are simply unlikely to be able to keep abreast of the 
information and keep their patients informed.  One study involving nearly 500,000 pregnant 
women showed that doctors only discussed potential pregnancy risks of medications with the 
patient 47-48% of the time when prescribing, even when studies showed high-risk for teratogenic 
effects.
71   
  Registries also routinely suffer from low levels of participation.  This weakens the 
usefulness of their information by making it difficult to detect whether there is a statistically 
significant difference between the rate of birth defects when using the drugs and the rate of birth 
defects in the general population.  The reasons for low participation in pregnancy registries are 
manifold.  Since registries often wait for volunteers to contact them rather than proactively 
seeking out users of the drug, they only accumulate data if a pregnant woman or her doctor 
independently chooses to report to the registry.  A doctor or patient who has reservations about 
data privacy, or who is simply uninformed or unmotivated is unlikely to volunteer.  Women may 
also be too embarrassed to report to registries if they deviated from their doctor’s advice or a 
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drug label warning not to use the medicine during pregnancy.
72  Clinical studies on the other 
hand, often actively recruit participants and can therefore encourage participation in ways that a 
passive registry cannot.   
  A second reason participation in registries may be low is that if a drug has multiple 
registries (for example, one founded by the drug manufacturer and the other by a nonprofit 
organization) women may only contact one of the registries.  The competing registries will 
divide the pool of eligible participants between them and will each have lower numbers of 
participating women as a result. 
  A third reason for low participation is more subtle.  Doctors and patients may only think 
to seek out a registry after an abnormality is detected.  Women with uneventful pregnancies and 
healthy infants may not give a second thought to medication that they used in pregnancy.  Also, 
waiting to report until abnormalities are observable by ultrasound, at birth, or at a later point, 
causes a delay which can be weeks, months, even years after the abnormality initially formed.  If 
an obstetrician is reporting to the registry on behalf of a patient, he or she will only be able to 
report drug effects that are observable before or at the time of birth, because the obstetrician will 
likely have no contact with the infant after the birth.
73  If a problem is not observed until later in 
the child’s life, the mother and the child’s pediatrician might be less likely to make the 
connection between the drug and the defect because the pediatrician might not have access to the 
mother’s prescription history during pregnancy and might not think to ask.  Given the lapse of 
time, the doctor also would be less likely to suspect that a child’s condition is caused by maternal 
drug exposure rather than an environmental source.  Thus many incidences of drug-related 
                                                 
72 See Ami E. Doshi, The Cost of Clear Skin: Balancing the Social and Safety Costs of iPLEDGE 
with the Efficacy of Accutane (Isotretinoin), 37 Seton Hall Law Review 625, 659 (2007). 
73 Rubin, supra note 1, at A1. 20 
 
abnormalities that are not immediately apparent to the naked eye at birth could go unreported.  If 
the mother were a participant in a clinical trial, however, researchers as part of the informed 
consent process would surely counsel her notify them if the child had any abnormal medical 
conditions that she became aware of only after the trial ended.   
  There is another, related problem with relying on detection of abnormalities as a basis for 
reporting to registries.  Birth defects can be masked by miscarriages, because a woman’s 
obstetrician is highly unlikely to autopsy a miscarried fetus to look for developmental 
abnormalities.  Since a significant number of pregnancies (20-30%) spontaneously abort, a 
woman outside of a clinical setting might have no reason to suspect her miscarriage was the 
result of a teratogen rather than natural causes.  A clinical researcher on the other hand would be 
able to investigate if there is a higher-than-normal rate of miscarriage among the test subjects 
that could be attributable to the drug, and also whether a fetus showed any signs of abnormal 
organ development prior to the miscarriage. 
  Furthermore, a mother who takes a particular drug for which safety in pregnancy is 
unknown may have no reason to suspect that her child harbors some unseen birth defect that is 
not immediately apparent to the naked eye.  Her child’s medical condition would go untreated 
during the intervening time between the formation of the abnormality and its detection by his 
pediatrician, which could be months or even years after birth.  In a clinical setting, however, 
researchers would be more likely to perform specialized screening tests would increase the 
likelihood that any problems are caught early and treated.  For example, ultrasound equipment is 
capable of performing a complete and thorough scan of a fetus that can successfully detect organ 21 
 
abnormalities in 90% of fetuses after the first 12–14 weeks of pregnancy.
74  Yet most 
obstetricians still wait until the end of the second trimester to perform a complete fetal anomaly 
scan.
75  This delay in ordinary obstetric practice is significant for two reasons.  First, if a woman 
begins taking drugs in her second trimester and the obstetrician’s subsequent scan reveals 
abnormalities, the woman would have no way of knowing whether those abnormalities predated 
the drug use.  Thus her report of birth defects to the registry could be a false positive indication 
of teratogenicity when in reality the drug had no effect.  A researcher in a clinical trial, however, 
would certainly know to scan the fetus prior to administering a drug, and so would be able to 
know of any pre-existing fetal conditions going into the drug trial.   
  Another flaw with registries is that they do not necessarily identify when during the 
pregnancy a birth defect originated.  A clinical trial in pregnant humans could be structured, as 
many animal trials are,
76 to identify the timing of any teratogenic effects.  This structure consists 
of dividing the test subjects into the three segments: the first group is tested during conception 
ion and the early stages of pregnancy, the second group is tested during organogenesis,
77 and the 
third group is tested during the third trimester and lactation to account for the different kinds of 
abnormalities that are specific to these distinct developmental periods.  A registry however, is 
unlikely to conflate participants who took the drugs at different stages in their pregnancies.  It is, 
of course, possible that a registry might only contain entries from women who all took the 
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medication at the exact same stage in their pregnancy, but there is certainly no guarantee that this 
will happen.   
  The timing of the drug exposure is vitally important, because a drug may be entirely 
harmless if administered during the early stages of pregnancy and yet cause birth defects when 
used in the second or third trimester, or vice versa.
78  Women who only need drugs for part of 
their pregnancy, or a women took a drug during the first few weeks of pregnancy before they 
new they were pregnant, might be unduly alarmed by a registry that discloses the drug causes 
birth defects without revealing what time periods during pregnancy the drug is dangerous.  This 
is especially troubling given that abortion is only constitutionally unrestricted in the first 
trimester, so a woman who is worried about an unintentional exposure at the start of her 
pregnancy may have very little time to make a decision whether to carry the fetus to term.  Since 
the registry will most likely not tell her specifically whether first trimester exposure to the 
medicine is harmful, and since any defects are unlikely to be observable by ultrasound in the first 
trimester, her difficult decision will almost certainly be uninformed.  Clinical trials would 
remedy this by identifying the timing, not just the incidence, of fetal abnormalities.   
  Registries also do not necessarily control for factors that could be contributing causes to 
an observed birth defect, such as environmental toxicants, family history or other prescription 
drugs.  Because women who report incidents to registries do not have conventional researcher-
subject relationships with the drug companies conducting the registries, those companies may 
not have complete access to the women’s medical records.  Even if a registry operator did 
attempt to collect information about a woman’s medical and environmental background, they 
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may not know which questions to ask, and the women may not be familiar enough with their full 
medical history to supply complete answers. 
  The postmarket nature of registries and the way in which they are conducted make them 
poor substitutes for clinical research.  Due to their secrecy and inaccessibility, pregnant women 
and their doctors may not have access to the information they generate.  Any information they 
are able to obtain from registries is probably unreliable and not likely to be independently 
corroborated through peer review.  As the FDA itself noted, “pregnancy exposure registries are 
limited to screening for major teratogens on the level of thalidomide,” and are not helpful for 
identifying subtler, more “modest risks.”
79  Because of the many innate flaws in registries, they 
do not and cannot provide pregnant women with the information they need to evaluate the risks 
and benefits of their medication.   
III.  The Role of the Government in Pregnant Women’s Exclusion from Clinical Trials  
A.  Policy Objections to DHHS Current Regulations in the Context of the Flawed 
History of Government Overzealousness in Limiting Pregnant Women’s Rights 
  This section of the paper articulates the view that pregnant women are presently treated 
as exceptional cases under the law in ways that impose atypical limitations on their freedom.  
Pregnant women are routinely characterized as having a special conflict of interest that other 
parents do not share vis a vis their offspring that justifies additional governmental intrusions into 
pregnant women’s autonomy.  The below examples of involuntary treatment orders and pregnant 
substance abusers illustrate that this characterization is overblown.  They show how 
discriminatory stereotypes about proper maternal behavior lead the government to unreasonably 
assume pregnant women pose a special risk to their fetuses and to consequently intrude on 
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pregnant women’s rights.  I use these examples to illustrate how the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) regulations on pregnant women’s participation in clinical trials 
constitute a similar unjustified overreaction to the perceived exceptional threat that pregnant 
women pose to the wellbeing of their fetuses.  I argue that the DHHS regulation should be 
abolished because it perpetuates the same unrealistic negative stereotypes about pregnant women 
as the discriminatory practices of involuntary cesarean orders and treatment of pregnant 
substance abusers.  The regulations are also especially restrictive ways that are likely to 
overdeter researchers who wish to conduct trials involving pregnant women. 
i.  Pregnancy Exceptionalism in Involuntary Treatment Orders 
  One extreme example of pregnancy exceptionalism in the law the practice of involuntary 
treatment orders for cesarean operations.  These occur when a physician believes that a cesarean 
is safer for the fetus than vaginal delivery and seeks a court order to compel a woman to submit 
to surgery against her will.  The substance of these orders is unprecedented.  No court has ever 
ruled that a parent be forced to undergo surgery (such as an organ transplant or blood 
transfusion) to save their dying child
80, yet courts are willing to order a highly invasive 
abdominal surgery to reduce a risk to a fetus from a vaginal birth.  This perplexingly gives a 
potential child whose survival is dependent on its maternal host greater protection than a living 
child with a wholly separate existence from its mother.   
  Though physicians rarely seek involuntary treatment orders, when they do judges are 
surprisingly willing to grant them.  Between 1987 and 2006, a stunning 86% of involuntary 
treatment orders sought by doctors against their pregnant patients were granted.
81  The procedure 
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involved in obtaining such orders is also atypical in alarming ways.  In the vast majority of cases, 
the judge was called to the hospital on an emergency basis to rule on the order, without any legal 
briefing on the issues and very often without counsel present to represent the pregnant woman’s 
interests.
82  Of the orders that were granted in the aforementioned 30 year time period, an 
astonishing 88% were decided within a mere six hours of the physician’s request.
83  This rapid 
turnover suggests little if any time was devoted to inquiry into the relevant law or any measured 
consideration of the issues.  Often there are also more subtle forms of procedural unfairness to 
the mother, such as the fact that the prospect of imminent compelled surgery will likely make a 
woman visibly upset and unable to articulate her position as calmly and collectedly as the 
hospital’s in-house counsel.
84   
  With so few safeguards for pregnant women’s rights, it is no wonder that many judge 
determine that a procedure is necessary for the health of the fetus only to later find out that they 
were wrong.  For example, in one case a pregnant woman in the advanced stages of cancer was 
forced by court order to submit to a cesarean operation to give a fetus with dubious viability a 
“better though slim chance” of survival.
85  The fetus did not survive the premature delivery, and, 
in her weakened state, the mother died within two days of the operation, which was a 
contributing cause of her death.
86  In another case a women was ordered to undergo an 
involuntary cesarean section because her placenta was blocking the birth canal, but before the 
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operation could be performed her placenta shifted and she was able to give birth to a healthy 
baby vaginally.
87 
  If a doctor were to seek an involuntary treatment for any patient other than a pregnant 
women, the situation would look quite different.  As previously mentioned, there is no 
recognized duty in the law for one person to undergo invasive medical treatments for the benefit 
of another, even when that person is one’s own child.  It does not suffice to distinguish the cases 
on the basis of necessity by saying that a fetus cannot be treated without breaching the mother’s 
physical integrity, and so his mother’s bodily invasion is his only means of securing medical 
treatment.  A parent has no comparable duty to undergo surgery for child who will surely die 
without an emergency organ transplant, even if the parent is the only compatible organ donor 
available.  Nor can you distinguish this scenario by arguing that a pregnant of women has a 
unique conflict of interest that interferes with her decisionmaking capabilities, because a parent 
asked to undergo surgery for an older child has the very same conflict when asked to undergo a 
risky surgery for their child’s benefit.  While one can certainly laud the self-sacrificing parent 
who would give a kidney for their child, just as one may lauds the man who jumps in front of 
train to a rescue his child who has wandered onto the tracks, or, indeed, just like as one may 
praise the countless women who voluntarily undergo cesarean sections for their fetus’ benefit, 
the law does not and should not require people to incur so great a detriment to themselves for the 
benefit of their offspring. 
  Furthermore, in a case involving any patient other than a pregnant woman, there are 
greater procedural safeguards in place.  A court order can only issue if the patient is deemed 
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incompetent to participate in his or her own medical decisions.  A determination that a person is 
legally incompetent is a classification normally reserved for patients who are unconscious or 
have severe mental disease,
88 not for healthy pregnant women whose sole “abnormality” is that 
they disagree with their doctor about how they would like to give birth to their baby.  Medical 
ethicists maintain that adults should be presumed competent to make their medical decisions 
unless evidence proves otherwise.
89  Also, for any other patient, the court order may only issue 
after a formal adversarial hearing and detailed fact-finding.
90  This process is a far cry from the 
chaotic, haphazard, uninformed decisions that judges are called upon to make about pregnant 
women’s competence in the urgent atmosphere of the emergency room. 
  In addition, in any other involuntary treatment order case the standard used by the court is 
“substituted judgment,” and the relevant inquiry whether the patient would necessarily consent to 
the presently unwanted medical treatment if he or she were mentally competent.
91  The inquiry is 
not whether third parties would benefit from performing the unwanted procedure on the patient, 
such as if doctors were to seek an order for an unwilling patient to submit to a bone marrow 
transplant to cure a close relative’s leukemia.  Yet for pregnant women, the courts appear to rank 
the fetus’ wellbeing over the mother’s stated preferences without ever inquiring whether a 
reasonable, sane woman might refuse to subject herself to an invasive cesarean surgery that 
carried an uncertain prospect of benefit to the fetus.   
  For a court to decide that a woman is as mentally incompetent solely because she is 
unwilling to risk life for the benefit of her fetus is grossly insulting.  For the court to accord her 
fewer procedural protections than an unconscious, imprisoned or insane individual is unfair.  
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This lack of basic legal protection for the mother is uniquely and disturbingly flippant towards a 
pregnant woman’s autonomy and legal rights.   
   This exceptional treatment does not make sense according to any analogy to existing 
parental obligations under the law or other legal procedures relating to incompetence in our 
society.  It does make sense if you accept that it is partially attributable to unconscious sex 
discrimination based on gender stereotypes.  The determination of incompetency coincides with 
longstanding myths that hormones in pregnancy induce a kind of hysteria that makes women 
literally crazy.  It also communicates the view that no rational woman could value her own safety 
more than of her fetus.  This demands a level of self-sacrifice that is unreasonable and likely 
based on sex stereotypes of a mother’s selfless devotion to her children.  It also espouses the 
patriarchal, proprietary notion that a woman’s rights are subordinate to a fetus’ because a woman 
has value only as a mere vessel for a man’s offspring.  This treats her as a means for the survival 
of a man’s progeny rather than as an end in and of herself.   
  It is also a view that is shared by some elements of the Fetal Rights Movement—the anti-
abortion backlash against Roe v. Wade.  Anti-abortion legislation has similarly presumed that 
women are incompetent to responsibly make abortion decisions without forced waiting periods 
to rethink their decision and mandatory abortion counseling to help them more thoughtfully and 
deliberately appreciate the risks and benefits of abortion.
92  At the same time the statutes require 
no such cautionary counseling for women who choose to carry their pregnancies to term even 
though there are similar complex risks and benefits inherent in that decision.  This asymmetry 
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carries with it the erroneous assumption that a woman is abnormal and somehow mentally 
deficient if she determines that her own wellbeing under the particular circumstances at hand 
should take precedence over the wellbeing of her fetus.  As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent 
from Casey, it is condescending to assume that a woman cannot make a reasoned decision to 
have an abortion without counseling, because “[n]o person undertakes such a decision lightly—
and States may not presume that a woman has failed to reflect adequately merely because her 
conclusion differs from the State’s preference.”
93  
  Some feminist scholars have attributed the rise of the fetal rights movement to a male 
backlash against growing female independence.  This perspective suggests men resent the fact 
that women have abandoned their “traditional nurturing role” as mothers in favor of having a 
career, and thus men seek to force women to conform to their view of self-sacrificing 
motherhood.
94  As one author wrote: 
“Men experiencing a loss of control over the individual women in their lives attempted to 
reassert it through the courts, urging judges to assert their power as parens patria 
(“father[s] of the country”) or to invoke a “state interest” in the fetus.”
95 
Regardless of whether this is indeed the case, the state actions still create the appearance that the 
state views women at least incompetent and, at worst, deviant and selfish, while at the same time 
viewing the fetus as a victim in need of state protection from its mother’s bad decisions.
96  These 
stereotypes are intolerable in a modern society, and yet they appear repeatedly in the context of 
government regulation of pregnant women and, I argue, in the current regulations governing 
pregnant women’s participation in clinical trials. 
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ii.  Pregnancy Exceptionalism in the Treatment of Pregnant Substance 
Abusers 
  Since the early 1980s, the government’s response to pregnant substance abusers has been 
drastic and overblown.  Courts routinely terminated the parental rights of substance abusers as 
soon as their babies were born.
97  Prosecutors use distorted interpretations of child endangerment 
laws to penalize pregnant substance abusers.
98  The judiciary has harshly penalized pregnant 
substance abusers for crimes wholly unrelated to their illegal drug use as a pretext for 
incarcerating them.  A Washington, D.C. judge sentenced Brenda Vaughn, a first time offender 
convicted for check fraud, to 180 days in jail even though the prosecutor asked only for 
probation.
99  The judge was unambiguous about his reasons for doing so; aware that Brenda was 
pregnant and had tested positive for cocaine, he declared at her sentencing hearing, “I am going 
to keep her locked up until the baby is born.”
100 
  However, scientific data is inconclusive as to whether alcohol, tobacco, opioids, 
amphetamines and even cocaine actually cause any lasting harm to fetuses.
101  In fact, the drug 
that appears from scientific data to cause the most harm, more than heroin or cocaine, is alcohol, 
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if it causes harm at all.
102  The side effects attributed collectively to the aforementioned 
substances are increased likelihood of miscarriage, premature birth, low birth weight, irritability 
and difficulty sleeping in the first few days or weeks after birth, delayed speech, and poor 
educational performance later in life.  Alcohol uniquely carries the added risk of fetal alcohol 
syndrome, which is associated with flattened facial features in addition to the previously-
discussed symptoms.   
  Many studies have concluded that higher incidences of these side effects among 
substance abusing mothers may actually be attributable to environment causes commonly shared 
by maternal substance abusers other than the drugs themselves.   
  One such factor is poverty, which carries with it numerous aspects like malnutrition, 
stress, overwork, lack of prenatal care, and domestic violence that can all independently cause 
low birth weight and stunted fetal development.  An especially compelling study compared 
middle class alcoholic women with impoverished alcoholic women.
103  Both groups frequently 
consumed excessive quantities of alcohol during pregnancy.  Yet 70.9% of children born to 
impoverished mothers suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome, compared to only 4.5% of children 
born to middle-class mothers.
104 
  Other scientists point out that due to substance abusers lifestyles, fetuses are more likely 
to be born with a range of medical conditions unrelated to the drug use itself, such as HIV and 
Hepatitis C, which can explain many of the symptoms associated with the substance abuse.
105   
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  Issues related to the infant’s parenting environment are also likely contributors to post-
birth “side-effects” of prenatal drug exposure.  For example, early researchers believed that 
infants born to opiate-addicted mothers exhibited withdrawal symptoms, but almost all of the 
infants used in those early studies had been removed from their mothers and observed in a 
clinical, rather than a natural home setting.
106  Later research showed that when mother and baby 
are allowed to remain together during clinical observations, the “symptoms” of the supposed 
withdrawal (irritability, crying, tensed muscles, difficulty sleeping and reluctance to feed) largely 
disappeared.
107  For cocaine, scientists have now reached a consensus that despite early alarm 
about “crack babies” in the media, cocaine use during pregnancy does not cause babies to 
experience withdrawal.
108   
  Scientists also now believe that parenting and environment cause many of the long-term 
development, educational and behavioral problems once attributed to prenatal substance abuse.  
For instance, although children whose mothers used opiates during pregnancy are statistically 
more likely to have low attention span, delayed speech and other learning disabilities, these 
effects all but disappeared in cases where children were raised in what researchers deemed “a 
supportive environment,” and the mothers did not use alcohol or a combination of other drugs 
during pregnancy.
109  The same holds true for cocaine and marijuana, and methamphetamines.
110 
A recent study even found that the majority of methamphetamine exposed children do not show 
any statistical increase in developmental delays over the normal population, even when the 
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parental environment is less than optimal.
111  Although it is still unclear whether the drugs 
combine with the other environmental factors to produce some cumulative negative effect on 
children born to substance abusers, or whether the environment causes are solely to blame, the 
one conclusion that is inescapable is that “the effects of prenatal substance use are not as 
profound as once believed.”
112 
  At the same time that the courts vilify pregnant substance abusers, they also overlook 
comparable, if not worse, parental malfeasance by men.  In one case, a pregnant women was 
admitted to the hospital after having been severely beaten by her husband.
113  The authorities did 
not charge the husband with any crime, but instead prosecuted the woman for child 
endangerment because hospital tests revealed she had been drinking.
114  Indeed, some 
researchers observe that female substance abuse is often a byproduct of male violence, 
explaining that women who are abused “self–medicate with alcohol, illicit drugs, and 
prescription medication in order to cope with the violence.”
115  70% of female substance abusers 
are physically abused.
116  Additionally, any harmful effect on the fetus from maternal drug use 
can be exacerbated by preconception paternal drug use.  Fathers’ preconception use of drugs and 
alcohol has been correlated with lower birth weight and other fetal injuries commonly associated 
with maternal substance abuse.
117 
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  Feminist voices argue that this gender asymmetry in the treatment of substance abusers is 
due to the perception that substance abusing women deviate from longstanding social norms of 
what it means to be a good mother.  Diana Meyers explained that “[m]others are culturally 
represented as self-sacrifical, unconditionally loving, and totally identified with their 
children.”
118  Janet Gallagher observed that as a consequence of those one-sided gender 
stereotypes “men’s deviations from parenting ideals are largely ignored by officials and by the 
media” even though men are more likely to physically and sexually abuse their children and can 
also harm their offspring through preconception drug and alcohol use, whereas widely-publicized 
media and political campaigns fiercely admonish women not to drink or smoke during 
pregnancy.
119    
  I do not wish to suggest that I condone pregnant women’s use of recreational drugs.  I 
merely wish to illustrate how the government and the public has, in the case of pregnant 
substance abusers, rushed to condemn those women as bad mothers and imposed serious 
sanctions on them without first determining that actual harm to the fetus occurred, and if it did 
occur, that recreational drugs were the cause rather than the innumerable other reasons 
approximately 4% of babies are born with severe birth defects.
120  In fact, for recreational drugs 
that actually do cause significant harm to the fetus, like methamphetamine, the government could 
very well be justified in prohibiting use of those drugs by pregnant women.  This does not, 
however, justify a ban in the clinical trial context, where any risk to the fetus is unknown and 
unproven because the drug has not yet been tested in pregnant women.  There is a real difference 
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between preventing pregnant women from taking action that is certain to cause specific, 
identifiable harm and preventing women from exposing their fetus to the mere possibility of 
vague, unknowable harms.  In addition, while recreational drugs have no benefit for women 
other than entertainment, medicinal drugs can have significant, even life-saving benefit for a 
mother.  Thus while it may make sense to restrict a woman’s freedom with regard to recreational 
drugs, there are added concerns that make it less appropriate to intrude on pregnant women’s 
freedom to participate in clinical trials of therapeutic drugs.  
iii.  Pregnancy Exceptionalism the Current Government Regulation of 
Pregnant Women’s Participation in Clinical Trials 
  Although the government’s exceptional treatment of pregnant women in the context of 
clinical drug trials is not viscerally distasteful on its face as involuntary cesareans, it too 
perpetuates unconscious sex stereotypes that portray women as mentally inferior to and socially 
less valuable than their unborn fetuses.  Although the FDA has yet to promulgate any specific 
rules for pregnant women in clinical research, the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) places additional restrictions on pregnant women’s participation in any clinical research 
trials that is financially supported by the Department.
121  This includes any research that is 
funded by DHHS grants, which constitutes a large proportion of academic research, research that 
is conducted by any DHHS employees, and research that is conducted by persons unaffiliated 
with DHHS who conduct research at DHHS facilities.
122  Although the regulations do not bind 
private researchers conducting their research on private property, they do capture a large swath 
of clinical drug trials across the country.  
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a.  The DHHS Regulations Inappropriately Classify Pregnant Women 
as a “Vulnerable” Population 
  Under the current regulatory scheme, pregnant women are classified as “vulnerable” 
research subjects.
123 The Department uses this classification as the basis for its “additional 
safeguards” which restrict researchers’ ability to obtain IRB approval for studies involving 
pregnant women.  
   According to the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research, vulnerable 
persons are individuals who are “incapable of protecting their own interests” due to “insufficient 
power, intelligence, education, resources, [or] strength.”
124  The international guidelines, unlike 
DHHS, do not include pregnant women under this category.
125  The rationale that justifies 
placing special restrictions on the freedom of vulnerable persons to consent to research is that 
those individuals lack the “capacity or freedom” to meaningfully consent.
126  A person lacks 
capacity to consent when their mental state prevents them from appreciating the risks and 
benefits of the clinical trial.  A person lacks freedom to consent when external coercive forces 
pressure them into consenting when they would otherwise consent.  The latter typically is found 
to occur when the vulnerable person is in a position of powerlessness relative to the researchers 
or the third party exerting the coercive pressure.  
  The DHHS regulations specify that vulnerable populations include children, prisoners, 
pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, the handicapped, educationally disadvantages 
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persons or economically disadvantaged persons.
127  The regulations go on to explain that such 
groups are innately vulnerable to “coercion or undue influence,” thereby adopting the “lack of 
freedom” rationale of the international guidelines test.
128  Feminist scholars have criticized the 
government’s assumption that pregnant women are inherently susceptible to coercion or undue 
influence, claiming that such an assumption is inappropriately paternalistic.
129  All of the 
vulnerable groups in the regulation aside from pregnant women do, for the most part, fit the 
rationales articulated in the regulation and in the international guidelines.  All lack freedom 
because they are dependent on others in ways that make them vulnerable to coercion:  children 
are wholly dependent on their parents for survival; prisoners are dependent on their wardens and 
can punished by them for noncompliance; mentally-disabled are dependent on their caregivers, 
psychiatrists, and legal guardians; the economically disadvantaged are dependent on researchers 
for money in payment for their participation; and the educationally disadvantaged are dependent 
on researchers for information about the risks and benefits of their participation.  Some of these 
groups may also lack capacity to appreciate the risks of the study: children lack capacity by 
virtue of their developing cognitive abilities and their inexperience; the mentally disabled lack 
capacity by virtue of their mental illness; and the educationally disadvantaged lack capacity by 
virtue of their lesser experience with complex decisionmaking and limited understanding of 
medical science. 
  All of this makes one wonder what it is that made DHHS presume all pregnant women 
meet their definition of vulnerability.  It is possible that under some circumstances a pregnant 
women could have attributes that would make her unable to meaningfully consent to 
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participation in research.  For example, a pregnant woman might become vulnerable research 
subject if she faces spousal or other familial pressures to undergo risky experimentation for the 
benefit of her fetus.  Yet if this is what DHHS had in mind, it makes little sense that the 
regulation goes on to permit pregnant women’s participation any time the purpose of the research 
is for the health needs of the fetus.  Also, unlike a child who faces pressure from a parent, a 
pregnant woman is an autonomous adult who is better able to resist pressures from others.  She is 
no different from a man who faces pressure from his adult children to participate in research for 
a treatment for Huntington’s disease or a kind of cancer that is genetically transmissible and so 
likely to benefit his children.  Yet we do not prohibit people with genetic disorders from 
participating in research because of the likelihood their family will pressure them, because 
people with genetic disorders are not necessarily dependent or powerlessness in a way that 
prevents them from withstanding that pressure.  
  It is arguable that pregnant women are more vulnerable to familial pressures than most 
because they may be financially dependent on a husband or other family members at a time when 
they face the imminent prospect of significant expenses from giving birth and raising a child.  
However, if that were the case, she would fall into the existing “economically disadvantaged” 
category in the regulation’s list of vulnerable groups, which would render the separate category 
for pregnant women redundant.  Also, it is demeaning to imply that a pregnant woman is 
necessarily incapable of financially supporting herself and her child.  Single mothers do so all the 
time.  While the state might plausibly argue that pregnancy discrimination in employment is a 
pervasive problem in this country that prevents many pregnant women from supporting 
themselves, such discrimination is illegal and it is unfair to restrict a pregnant woman’s freedom 
to participate in clinical research because other people might break the law.  To do so would give 39 
 
discriminatory employers veto power over a pregnant woman’s free choice.  Such a rationale 
would also likely run afoul of the Constitution, which prohibits state action that is premised on 
the existence of discrimination by private actors.
130 
  A pregnant woman might also be vulnerable if she experiences mental illness as a side 
effect of pregnancy, as a substantial minority of pregnant women do.  But again, the regulations 
already recognize mental deficiency as a vulnerable class, so a separate category for pregnant 
women cannot be justified on the ground of mental illness. 
  It also is wrong to deem pregnant women as a class to be vulnerable the way the DHHS 
regulations do on the grounds that some but not all pregnant women will be vulnerable in the 
above-listed ways.  The aforementioned international ethical guidelines stress that the proper 
inquiry for classifying a group as vulnerable is not whether individual persons within a group are 
vulnerable, but whether all the persons receiving special treatment have individual attributes that 
make him or her vulnerable.
131  For example, some elderly people are vulnerable because they 
may have dementia that makes them incapable of understanding the risks of research, or they 
may be institutionalized in a nursing home or hospital whose staff could coerce them into giving 
consent.
132  However, the vulnerability of a subset of elderly persons is not sufficient to establish 
vulnerability for the entire class of elderly persons.  Elderly research subjects are only vulnerable 
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“if and when they acquire vulnerability-defining attributes.”
133  The groups in the DHHS 
regulation are different from the elderly in this regard because coercion or incapacity are 
necessary characteristics of those groups.  Since children cannot be legally emancipated from 
their parents or guardians, they will always be dependent to parents and therefore always subject 
to coercion.  Prisoners by virtue of their imprisonment are subject to coercion by the state.  
Economic disadvantage is the very reason economically-disadvantaged persons are subject to 
coercion from offers of payment by researchers.  Mental illness and lack of education are the 
reasons that mentally-disabled and educationally-disadvantaged persons, respectively, lack 
capacity.  In other words, for the other vulnerable populations enumerated in the DHHS 
regulation, the group is defined by the trait that makes that group vulnerable.  Pregnancy by itself 
is not a trait that causes coercion or lack of capacity.  A pregnant woman who is mentally sound 
and economically independent has absolutely no inherent restrictions on her autonomy or her 
mental capacity that would necessarily render her any more unfit than the average adult to give 
informed consent.  
  In the end, it is hard to imagine what nondiscriminatory reason the DHHS had in mind 
when it deemed pregnant women vulnerable, because nothing inherent to pregnancy itself makes 
a pregnant woman less capable than any other adult of appreciating the risks and benefits of 
participation in medical research.  The only reason to categorically view all pregnant women as 
vulnerable in the context of medical research is if you argue all pregnant women are either lack 
freedom to consent because they are subject to special coercive pressures, or that all pregnant 
women lack capacity to consent because of their mental state.  Both arguments are unjustified by 
reality and demeaning to women.  To argue that all women are dependent on others in the same 
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way that children, prisoners, and the indigent are suggests that women are equally as incapable 
of financially supporting themselves.  Any cursory glance at employment statistics reveals this 
simply is not true.  To argue that some pregnant women are subject to coercion from emotional 
pressures placed on them by their family views ignores the numerous contexts in which men and 
nonpregnant women can be subject to familial pressures that are equally coercive.
 134  In order to 
plausibly distinguish pregnant women and justify their exceptional treatment under the law, you 
have to view them as somehow less mentally resilient or less capable of independent 
decisionmaking than ordinary adults.  This unfounded stereotype that women, and especially 
pregnant women, have a weak mental constitution relative to men is reprehensible.   
  Similarly unacceptable is the suggested that a woman, merely by being impregnated, 
somehow loses the mental faculties that allowed her to make informed decisions about clinical 
research participation before she became pregnant.  Any argument that a pregnant woman lacks 
mental capacity to fully appreciate the risks and benefits of clinical trials echoes the invidious 
stereotype of pregnant women as “hysterical”—the archaic belief that a the state of pregnancy so 
governs a woman’s mental processes that she cannot make rational, autonomous decisions the 
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way men can, so men should make the decisions for her.
135  Such rationales were once used to 
promote the exclusion of women from the workforce and from voting.
136   
  Some suggest that the vulnerability classification exists not because pregnant women are 
vulnerable, but because the fetuses.  This argument does make sense to a certain degree given 
that children are also vulnerable subjects, and both children and fetuses are incapable of 
meaningfully participating in informed consent.  However, if this is the case, the regulation 
should unambiguously state that fetuses are the vulnerable population, not pregnant women.  
This would avoid the demeaning connotations of labeling pregnant women vulnerable.  Whether 
or not DHHS’ decision to designate all pregnant women vulnerable actually is based in part by 
unconscious sex discrimination, it certainly is an odd presumption that sends an unseemly 
message about pregnant women’s autonomy. 
b.  The DHHS Regulations Inappropriately Restrict Pregnant 
Women’s Ability to Participate in Clinical Research  
  Even if fetuses can be justifiably classified as a vulnerable population, like children, the 
DHHS regulation is exceptional because it goes much further than the restrictions placed on 
research involving child subjects in ways that yet again invoke invalid stereotypes.  I argue that 
as a matter of sound public policy, the existing regulations should be changed to provide women 
with meaningful access to clinical trials for themselves and their fetuses.  I contend that for the 
reasons discussed below the regulations as they currently stand are unduly prohibitive of 
research.  
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    To begin with, the regulation has internal contradictions that could confuse and deter 
research.  The regulation requires informed consent for pregnant subjects to comply with the 
general rules for informed consent for all other subjects in DHHS supported research.
137  
However, for research on pregnant women, the regulation also prohibits outright certain 
communications between the researcher and pregnant subjects.  Specifically, the regulation 
obligates researchers to have “no part in any decisions as to the timing, method, or procedures 
used to terminate a pregnancy.”
138  These prohibitions likely prohibit a researcher from meeting 
the ethical standard for informed consent.  According to the International Ethical Guidelines for 
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, a researcher must inform a pregnant subject 
about the option of terminating the pregnancy as part of the informed consent process, provided 
abortion is legal under those circumstances.
139  DHHS informed consent rules further require “a 
description of any foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject,” and elective abortion can be a 
foreseeable risk in many clinical trial contexts.  If a pregnant women has a serious medical 
condition which the clinical trial is designed to treat, it may be the case that she is not cured by 
the trial therapy and her medical condition necessitates terminating the pregnancy for the sake of 
her health or even her life.  Similarly, an experimental drug could have the potential for rare side 
effects that are so devastating to the mother’s health that abortion would be necessary to preserve 
the health or life of the mother.  Under the current regulation, a researcher would be helpless to 
warn a pregnant woman of the exact nature of the risk she faces.  If he tells her any details of the 
relative risks and discomforts of various available abortion procedures at different stages of 
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pregnancy, he could be deemed to have had a part in determining the timing or method of 
pregnancy termination. 
  Also, since terminating the pregnancy can mean birth in addition to elective abortion, the 
regulations interfere with their own requirement that all risks be minimized.  For a study of the 
effects of drugs in late pregnancy, it may be best for a researcher to encourage a subject to 
induce labor if she goes significantly past her due date to avoid harm to the baby and the mother 
from excessively delayed birth.  Moreover, if it appears the drugs are harmful to the fetus, simply 
withholding future medication may not be enough to minimize harm to the fetus.  Many drugs 
can remain in the pregnant woman’s system long after she ceases to take them, causing 
additional harm to the fetus.  In such cases, it may be best to induce labor to prevent further 
damage to the viable fetus’ development.  The DHHS regulations prevent this not only by 
excluding the researcher from the decision to end a pregnancy, but also through a separate 
provision that prevents a researcher from having any part in determining the viability of a 
fetus.
140 
  The regulation bars researchers from offering any “inducement, monetary or otherwise” 
to end a pregnancy.
141  Although it is understandable that the department would wish to avoid 
pressuring a woman to have an abortion, it is unwise to set up a system in which researchers 
cannot compensate a woman who understandably wants an abortion because of her participation 
in the study.  A woman could, for example, find out via ultrasound that her fetus will be born 
with severe birth defects that would cause the child to suffer, or a woman may need to abort a 
fetus for health reasons related to the clinical trial.  Since research subjects may be unable to pay 
for an abortion themselves, which runs an average price tag of $400 in the first trimester but 
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costs thousands if performed later in the pregnancy,
142 a researcher may not be able to recruit 
participants unless he can compensate them for the expense of a necessary abortion.  Ironically, 
the rules prohibit compensation for the kind of loss that a pregnant women might most want 
compensation for. 
    In addition to the internal contradictions in the regulation, the regulation has other 
substantive limits on pregnant women’s participation that are unreasonably restrictive.  For any 
study with greater than minimal risk to the fetus, a woman cannot participate in a study unless 
she can show that the study will directly benefit either herself or the fetus.
143  This puts the 
burden on researchers to prove the drug’s therapeutic value before it has even been tested in a 
relevant clinical population.   
  Even if the research is designed to directly the woman or the fetus, the regulations require 
that the “risk is the least possible for achieving the objectives of the research.”
144  This too puts 
researchers in an awkward and perhaps impossible position because it forces them to prove the 
risks of a particular therapy before they have human data to support their risk estimates.  
Moreover, it unreasonably interferes with a researcher’s assessment of drug effectiveness, 
because the most effective dose in a pregnant woman may present more risk to the fetus than a 
less effective but safer dose.  A researcher may also feel constrained by the “lease possible” risk 
requirement to test only at the lowest dose that could be effective, even if a higher dose would be 
more medically beneficial to women suffering from a particular disease or ailment. 
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  The statute also allows a study to proceed if it presents only “minimal risk” and “the 
purpose of the research is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be 
obtained by any other means.”
145  Again, it is unrealistic to expect a researcher to declare that a 
drug has minimal risk before clinical research has been conducted, because without research it is 
difficult to determine a risk is no greater than minimal.
146  A cautious researcher would very 
likely be reluctant to vouch that a drug has a minimal risk of harm only to be proved wrong later 
when clinical testing shows otherwise.  Also, the researchers may have a difficult time 
reconciling this provision with their informed consent obligations, because it may appear 
misleading for them to declare on the one hand to the IRB that the drug presents only minimal 
risk to the fetus, and then inform their research subjects that their fetuses may experience 
unforeseen serious side effects from the drug.   
  Also inexplicable is the requirement that in addition to only minimal risk, the study must 
be necessary to uncover important biomedical knowledge that cannot be obtained through any 
other means.  This is a surprisingly high threshold for a researcher to meet given that the minimal 
risk is defined as such a low risk under the statute.  Minimal risk is risk of harm or discomfort 
that is no more likely to occur or more severe than harm or discomfort which occurs in ordinary 
life or in routine physical examinations.
147  In other words, a study with minimal risk leaves a 
fetus as well off after the experiment as it would have been had the experiment not occurred.  
Such a risk is virtually inconsequential.  Yet even for studies with so low a risk, the statute 
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requires that a researcher show he will gain “important” knowledge that he could not have any 
other way.  This opens the door for an IRB to reject out of hand any study with minimal risk 
simply because it does not view the research sufficiently important, or because it believes post-
market studies or registries or studies in nonpregnant women or men could provide adequate 
information instead.  It also represents a much more stringent standard than studies on children 
and even newborn infants, which DHHS allows any time there is no greater than minimal risk 
and at least one parent consents.
148  To treat a fetus as deserving of greater protections than a 
living child is so unprecedented that it is almost absurd.  While it may be justifiable to have a 
system that gives the same protections for children and a viable fetus, or a fetus with sentience or 
the ability to feel pain, there can be no explanation for why a fetus should be protected more than 
a living child.  
  Furthermore, minimal risk is itself simply too constraining a limit on nontherapeutic 
studies on pregnant women.  When a woman recreationally uses alcohol or tobacco she exposes 
her fetus to greater than normal (i.e. not minimal) levels of risk.
149  Although such actions are 
socially frowned-upon, they are still legal.  In the context of recreational drug use, at least the 
law permits pregnant woman to do what a nonpregnant woman or a man could do, despite risk to 
the fetus.  However, if a pregnant chooses to enroll in a clinical drug trial that presents more than 
minimal risk with the altruistic goal of promoting medical knowledge and improving public 
health, the law prohibits her from doing while at the same time allowing any other adult to take 
on those risks.
150  It can scarcely be contested that a pregnant woman’s altruistic reasons for 
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imbibing drugs in the context of a clinical trial are more socially beneficent than purely the 
recreational motives of women who smoke or drink during pregnancy.  Also, a clinical trial 
minimizes harm to the fetus through ongoing monitoring and, if necessary, medical treatment.  
Such supervision is lacking in recreational uses of alcohol and tobacco, meaning the rationale for 
government intervention is even stronger there than in clinical trials.  Yet in spite of this the law 
inexplicably accords greater respect to a woman’s freedom in the context of recreational legal 
drug use than in the context of medically-supervised clinical trials.   
  The fact of the matter is that women engage in an enormous range of activities that pose a 
greater than minimal risk to the fetus.  Driving a car, participating in sports, living in a town near 
a chemical factory, working with chemicals, gaining excessive weight and overindulging in 
caffeine all expose a gestating fetus to risks that are out of the ordinary.
151  Yet we do not revoke 
pregnant women’s driver licenses, force them to relocate and quit their hazardous jobs, give them 
specially restricted menus at restaurants, or ban them from Starbucks.  The government’s 
decision to single out clinical trials as the one area of a woman’s life that they will not tolerate 
minimal risk to a fetus is an unjustified exception to practice of tolerating risk from women’s 
choices in other aspects of her life.  If the government were to prohibit risk to the fetus in all 
situations, a pregnant woman’s activities would be so constrained she could not function with 
any semblance of normality.  We routinely permit women to do things that could increase risk to 
her fetus because we trust a mother to weigh the risks and make an informed decision.  Indeed, it 
is even more likely she will be able to make a fully informed decision in the context of a clinical 
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trial than in her everyday life, because researchers must fully inform subjects of the risks and 
benefits before obtaining their consent.   
  The Department of Health and Human Services’ decided to take the risk-benefit decision 
out of a pregnant woman’s hands and decide for itself what level of risk is acceptable.  The 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects express the 
opinion that the decision whether to accept the fetal risks posed by a clinical trial should be made 
by the pregnant subject as part of the informed consent process.
152  The Department’s decision is 
only logical if you accept the premise that a pregnant women cannot be trusted to properly weigh 
the risks to herself and her fetus against the benefits of the research.  This assumption plays into 
the stereotype that women are inherently selfish and therefore cannot make “good” decisions 
during pregnancy.  The statute’s presumption of excluding women unreasonably concludes that 
pregnant women will make bad choices if they are presented with a choice, and so no choice 
should be left up to them.   
  The Department’s policy also penalizes all pregnant women for the mistakes of an errant 
minority who make decisions without giving due weight to the fetus’ wellbeing.  As a report 
from the Committee on Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical 
Studies explains:  
“Virtually all women desire healthy infants, even when their pregnancies are unplanned.  
While occasionally there may be pregnant women who are incapable of acting in the interest 
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of their future children, it would be inappropriate to base a public policy on an atypical case, 
rather than a normative case.”
153 
  By defining minimal risk as no greater than the ordinary level of risk a fetus would 
experience from everyday life, the statute also presumes that it is unacceptable for a woman to 
expose her fetus to any risk that is greater than normal, even if it is only a marginal increase over 
everyday risk, unless her use of the drug is therapeutic.  This ignores the indirect benefits of drug 
testing to a pregnant woman such as increased knowledge about drug safety that can be for used 
by other pregnant women or, indeed, by her in subsequent pregnancies if a medical need for the 
drug later arises.  A normal risk-benefit calculus usually factors in societal benefits.  The DHHS 
circumvents this for pregnant women by concluding that no societal benefit can ever outweigh a 
slightly elevated risk to a particular fetus.  Overall, DHHS’s willingness to decide these risk-
benefit decisions on behalf of pregnant women is troubling as a matter of policy, because risks 
and benefits have very subjective value,
154 and because it suggests that women’s ability to make 
an informed decision is less trustworthy than a man’s.      
B.  Constitutional Challenges to the Current Governmental Restrictions on Pregnant 
Women’s Participation in Clinical Research 
i.  Due Process 
  One avenue for challenging the existing DHHS regulations is by analogy to the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to abortion first articulated in Roe v. Wade.  Roe set 
out a structure for balancing the maternal privacy interest in abortion against the state’s 
compelling interest in the protection of fetal rights.  For the first trimester, the maternal right 
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always prevails, for the period between the start of the second trimester and viability, the state’s 
interest justifies restrictions that do not constitute an undue burden on the women, and after 
viability the state’s interest justifies an outright ban on abortion.
155  The court subsequently 
reaffirmed Roe’s essential holding in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
156 and clarified that any 
state-imposed restrictions before viability may not constitute an undue burden on a woman’s 
right to an abortion.
157 
  There are two chief difficulties with forming an analogy to abortion.  First, while an 
aborted fetus only ever has a potential for life outside the womb before viability, a fetus in a 
clinical trial may go on to be born and attain full personhood.  Because of this distinction, it 
could be argued the state has a greater interest in protecting a fetus from clinical trial harms that 
can affect the fetus after birth, than from abortion, which by definition only affects the fetus 
before birth.   
  Another reason it is difficult to analogize a right to an abortion to a right to a clinical trial 
is because of the nature of interests at stake.  One of the interests articulated by the Roe court is 
the interest in preventing “direct harm medically diagnosable in early pregnancy.”
158  However, 
the DHHS regulations do accommodate this interest by allowing participation by pregnant 
women in research when the research presents a direct health benefit to the mother.  Other 
maternal interests articulated by the Roe court include imminent psychological distress, mental 
and physical, the distress of an unwanted child or a child that the woman is unable to care for, or 
the stigma of unwed motherhood.
159  For the kind of research that the DHHS restricts, i.e. 
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participation in research that does not have a direct medical benefit for the mother, it is harder to 
articulate the kinds precise personal harms that ensue from a woman’s lack of access.  The harms 
from the DHHS regulation are more indirect than the harms of being denied an abortion.  As 
previously discussed, the DHHS regulations overly deter drug testing in women, meaning that all 
women suffer collective harm from being denied information they need when they become 
pregnant and have taken or will take untested medication.  While this harm can have serious 
effects on pregnant women’s stress levels, hazardous consequences for their health and their 
fetuses wellbeing, and can result in an unwanted abortion due to fears of the uncertain risks, it is 
hard to directly attribute these harms to the DHHS regulations themselves because the harms are 
somewhat attenuated from the government action and because the women who suffer the harms 
may not necessarily be the same women who are denied access to a particular drug trial.  
  The decision by a woman to participate in clinical trials while pregnant could also be 
likened to the right to terminate artificial life support, i.e. the “right to die” that was upheld by 
the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health.
160  One could argue that if a woman 
has a privacy right to make a medical decision that would end her life, she should certainly have 
the right to participate in the decision to undergo medical risk to save the lives of others by 
providing needed information about pregnancy remedies for their illnesses.
161  Although the state 
will likely argue its interest in protecting fetal life should outweigh the individual’s right to 
medical self-determination, the state of Missouri attempted to make the same argument in 
Cruzan by asserting “an interest in the preservation of human life” generally, and the state’s 
argument failed then.
162  However, the court emphasized that the decision to end one’s life was a 
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“deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality,” which tilted the balancing of 
interests in favor of the individual’s privacy right over the state’s interest in life.
163  It may be 
harder to argue that a woman’s decision to participate in a clinical trial is as deeply personal an 
interest when she would not directly benefit from the trial.  Since the DHHS regulations do allow 
participation with direct benefit to the pregnant woman, the argument that the regulations violate 
Due Process under Cruzan is harder to make.  
ii.  Equal Protection 
  There is no question that the DHHS regulations treat men and women differently.  The 
most blatant unequal treatment of men and women under the law governing clinical research is 
the fact that the DHHS regulations place restrictions only placed on pregnant and pregnable 
women, and not men that are capable of conceiving children.  Yet men are also capable of 
causing birth defects in their offspring through preconception and postconception exposure to 
teratogens.
164  Such inequality is wrong because shifts all responsibility, and therefore all blame, 
for fetal injury to mothers while at the same time completely relieving men of that 
responsibility.
165 
  There is one FDA guidance document that suggests a need for increased protections for 
research subjects in studies involving male teratogens.  That guidance document indicates that 
where animal studies or other data shows a propensity for causing sperm, testicular, or 
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chromosomal anomalies, the decision to include men in clinical trials should take into account 
“the nature of the abnormalities, the dosage at which they occurred, the disease being treated, the 
importance of the drug, and the duration of drug administration.”
166  In other words, the guidance 
recommends that the researcher perform the ordinary risk/benefit analysis for male teratogens.  
The guidance further states that “in some cases special written consent forms, even in Phase III 
may be required.”
167  Significantly, this ‘requirement’ is not even enforceable by the FDA since 
the beginning of the guidance document specifically states that the guidelines are 
recommendations only, and “are not to be interpreted as mandatory requirements by the 
FDA.”
168  This written consent provision also leaves the decision of whether to participate in the 
drug trial up to the male research subject, thereby allowing a father to unilaterally consent to a 
process that may harm a fetus conceived during the experiment.  In contrast, the DHHS 
regulations require a father’s consent in addition to the mother’s before she is permitted to 
participate in a trial that would not directly benefit her.
169  This inconsistency implies that a man 
can be trusted to unilaterally make decisions that could result in birth defects to his offspring, but 
a woman cannot be allowed to make the same decision unless the father agrees with her choice.  
Not only is this inconsistency unequal, it is also an unreasonable burden on pregnant women’s 
ability to make decisions about her own body, because it gives a veto power to any biological 
father aside from a rapist whose consent can be obtained.
170  This veto power applies even if that 
biological father is estranged from the mother, a domestic abuser, an extortionist who attempts to 
                                                 
166 U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CTR. DRUG EVAL. RES. 
(CDER), GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:  GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CLINICAL EVALUATION 
OF DRUGS 14 (1997). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 3. 
169 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(e). 
170 Id. 55 
 
secure a bribe in return for his consent, or a man who has no intention of assuming any parental 
responsibilities towards or having any relationship with his biological child. 
  A further example of the government’s unequal treatment of the sexes can be seen 
through the precautions the government requires from researches who test drugs in women who 
could become pregnant over the course of the study.  One industry survey shows that the FDA 
asks 79% of pharmaceutical companies to exclude fertile women from early stage drug trials.
171  
In one example, the drug Proscar was known to cause teratogenic effects when used by men 
prior to conception.  Yet in a study involving Proscar, the IRB approved research that simply 
accepted man’s promise that he would use contraception during the trial, without any follow up 
to ensure compliance.
172  Pregnable women on the other hand must undergo far greater 
protectionist measures before they can be exposed to known teratogens.  Accutane, a popular 
acne-fighting prescription drugs that is used by approximately 200,000 people each month,
173 is 
another known teratogen that causes severe heart and brain damage in children born to parents 
who use the drug.
174  Although the FDA requires that both men and women who take Accutane 
enroll in a registry to study to the effects in their offspring, only women have to comply with 
additional stringent FDA restrictions on their use of the drug.
175  Before a woman can obtain a 
prescription for Accutane from her doctor, she must enroll by phone in an FDA-mandated 
program, called “iPledge” in a registration process that many doctors and pharmacists complain 
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is lengthy and confusing.
176  Once enrolled in the program, the woman must immediately take 
two pregnancy tests to confirm she is not pregnant before obtaining her prescription.
177  Prior to 
each monthly refill, she must take and pass another pregnancy test.
178  While using the drug, the 
woman must successfully pass an examination composed of questions designed to test her 
understanding of her birth control obligations and the pregnancy risks of the drug.
179 
  Thus the FDA imposes a double standard.  When a man could impregnate a woman and 
father a child with birth defects caused by his exposure to a teratogenic drug, his word that he 
will use contraception is enough.  Yet when a woman could become pregnant with a child who 
may have birth defects because of her drug exposure, the government requires her to undergo 
numerous onerous procedures designed to ensure she uses contraceptives.  Whether intentional 
or not, this practice sends a message that men can be trusted to safeguard the welfare of their 
potential future children, but women are too unreliable to trust their word alone on under the 
exact same circumstances.   
  It may be the case that measures like iPledge are necessary for people to comply with 
their doctor’s or researcher’s instructions for taking a known severe teratogen.  Yet even if this is 
the case there is still no articulable scientific basis for requiring those measures only for women 
and not from men.  Though it is true that a woman might lie about her contraception plans, forget 
to use contraception, or use contraception that fails, the same is true for a man.
180  Even if male 
teratogens might cause less frequent or less severe injury on average than female teratogens, 
which we have no way of knowing because of the shortage of clinical research on teratogenic 
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effects, it is still unacceptable that the law singles out pregnant women for restrictions while 
adopting a laissez-faire attitude towards fertile men.
181  
  The evidence that women and men are treated differently under the current regulatory 
system is clear.  However, the mere fact of unequal treatment may not be enough to constitute 
sex discrimination under the Constitution.  Although the constitutional language on its face says 
that no state can “deny any person . . . the equal protection of the laws,”
182 the Supreme Court 
has interpreted this narrowly as applied to sex discrimination.  In Geduldig v. Aiello, the 
Supreme Court announced that not all discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is discrimination 
on the basis of sex.
183  The court held that California statute which required disability insurance 
for all medical conditions except pregnancy did not invidiously discriminate against women, 
because (1) the statute discriminates between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons 
(including nonpregnant women), not between similarly situated men and women, and because 
(2) the benefits of the coverage for non-pregnancy related conditions “accrue to members of both 
sexes.”
184  It is worth noting at the outset that Geduldig has been heavily criticized by scholars 
and subsequent Supreme Court cases limit its holding to insurance claims.
185  Thus it is an open 
question whether a current or future Court might reverse Geduldig and hold pregnancy 
discrimination is sex discrimination. 
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  However, even if Geduldig is good law it is still distinguishable from the DHHS 
regulations in ways that could render the regulations unconstitutional.  First, the men at issue in 
Geduldig were not similarly situated to the women women because the men could never 
personally obtain any benefit from pregnancy disability coverage.  Thus the court could arguably 
maintain that the California statute did not give women anything less than it gave men, because it 
gave them the same coverage, that is, coverage for all conditions except pregnancy.  The clinical 
trial regulations are different because men are similarly situated to women since both men and 
women alike can risk birth defects in their offspring through exposure to experimental drugs.  
Thus the statute gives men unhindered access to clinical trials, while giving women access to the 
same trials, with the same risks, under only limited and prohibitive circumstances.  This treats 
women different than similarly situated men in a way that the California disability statute did 
not.   
  Additionally, the regulatory regime does not provide men and women with the same 
underlying benefits of clinical trial research, because men are guaranteed clinical data on drug 
safety and effectiveness that allows them to make informed decisions about medication use 
throughout their entire lives, and women are not assured access to the same clinical data during 
any period in their lives when they are pregnant.  This disparity puts women at a disadvantage 
relative to men that could be enough to constitute sex discrimination.
186  Men and women also do 
not receive the same access to clinical trials, which can be a benefit in and of itself to the extent 
that the trials provide compensation, enable subjects to feel they are contributing to a good cause, 
or medically benefit the subjects.
187   
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  Another case that provides a basis for a legal challenge to the DHHS regulations is 
Johnson Controls.
188  There the court invalidated an employer’s policy which excluded pregnant 
or pregnable female employees from jobs that would expose them to lead, an environmental 
teratogen.
189  The court based its decision on the fact that despite the employer’s claim that the 
policy had a nondiscriminatory purpose of fetal protection, the policy did not equally protect the 
offspring of male and female employees: 
“Despite evidence in the record about the debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male 
reproductive system, Johnson Controls is concerned only with the harms that may befall 
the unborn offspring of its female employees.”
190 
The Court went on in dicta to express its opinion that choices involving risks to the fetus should 
rest with the parents who will experience the costs of those risks, not with the employer or the 
courts.  It stated, “Decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who 
conceive, bear, support, and raise them.”
191  Such broad language implies that the decision to 
participate in trials of potentially teratogenic drugs should be left up to the parents through the 
informed consent process rather than imposed on them by a regulatory mandate. 
  Although Johnson Controls specifically addressed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act rather 
than the Constitution, it still governs paid research subjects if they can be considered 
“employees” of the drug company conducting the research.  If research subjects are not found to 
be employees under Title VII, Johnson Controls nonetheless indicates that the Supreme Court 
may be more inclined in the future to accept pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex 
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discrimination under the Constitution where men and women are similarly able to cause birth 
defects, and a fetal protection policy excludes only women from activities involving teratogens.   
  Johnson Controls also illuminates the way in which invidious stereotypes can underlie a 
policy that appears on its face to be based on a neutral rationale of fetal protection.  A defense 
expert was asked during deposition why he did not prohibit male employees’ exposure to lead 
when all scientific evidence indicated that such exposure caused birth defects in children 
conceived by those men.  His response was not that he doubted the studies’ veracity, but that he 
simply “can’t control that situation.”
192  Implicit in his response was his belief that female 
reproduction can be legitimately controlled by her employer, but men’s freedom to reproduce is 
inviolate.
193   
 
IV.  The Unjustified Nature of Manufacturer’s Fears of Liability in Light of Prevailing Tort 
Doctrine 
  Many pharmaceutical companies allege that even if the regulatory restrictions on research 
were lifted, they could not possibly conduct clinical research in pregnant subjects because of the 
enormous litigation costs that would inevitably ensue.  These allegations are heavily exaggerated 
at best, and are directly contradicted by the relevant tort law at worst. 
  Ever since Thalidomide and DES caused serious birth defects among children born to 
pregnant users of the drugs, the pharmaceutical industry has taken a hands-off approach to 
pregnancy testing and cited fears of litigation as its reason.
194  However, neither drug was ever 
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tested in pregnant women prior to its release onto the market.
195  DES did not undergo any 
animal teratogenicity testing either.
196  Thalidomide underwent some animal testing which 
suggested reproductive safety in animals, but as the FDA employee reviewing the 
manufacturer’s application for approval observed, thalidomide is metabolized very differently in 
animals than in humans and so animal tests could not serve as a valid indicator of 
teratogenicity.
197  Had the tests been conducted in humans the dangers would have been 
immediately apparent, since 100% of women exposed during the timeframe when limb 
malformations in pregnancy occur gave birth to babies with noticeable birth defects.
198 
  Another case study often cited by the pharmaceutical industry is that of Bendectin, an 
anti-nausea drug that its manufacturer, Merrell Dow, withdrew voluntarily from the market in the 
face of growing litigation costs.
199  The Bendectin lawsuits were since proven frivolous—
premised on “junk science” conducted by plaintiffs’ experts-for-hire.
200  As a result, Merrell 
Dow lost a profitable U.S. market, although the drug is still sold abroad,
201 and American 
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consumers lost a valuable remedy for morning sickness which, in severe cases, can cause 
extreme dehydration, weight loss, and even death in pregnant women.
202   
  While the Bendectin case is unfortunate, upon closer examination it does not in any way 
support the industry’s proposition that drug testing in pregnant women would result in increased 
liability.  Merrell Dow was never actually held liable for its Bendectin sales in any court of law.  
All of the lawsuits against it were either dismissed, overturned on appeal, or settled for small 
amounts of money.
203  Even though it underwent costs of defending the suits, none of those 
lawsuits were brought by participants in a clinical drug trial, because Merrell Dow did not 
conduct clinical trials in pregnant women. 
  Moreover, the Bendectin litigation gave rise to an important Supreme Court decision 
concerning the drug.  The case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, raised the standard for 
admissibility of expert testimony
204 and has since significantly cut back on the kind of 
speculative science that allowed the Bendectin suits to be brought in the first place.  After 
Daubert, the likelihood of widespread frivolous litigation against pharmaceutical companies has 
diminished.
205  Plaintiffs’ lawyers can no longer proceed with claims unless the pharmaceutical 
company sold the drug without adequate warnings in spite of reliable scientific evidence 
obtained with proven methods showing the existence of birth defects.  In the end, the Bendectin 
litigation provided the solution to its own problem of frivolous litigation.   
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  As the law currently stands, pharmaceutical companies may run a greater risk of litigation 
now than if they were to conduct clinical studies.  There is no automatic strict liability for 
harmful drugs under common law because pharmaceutical drugs meet the “unavoidably unsafe” 
exception to strict liability.  The comments to the Restatement 2
nd of Torts identify drugs as “an 
especially common” form of “unavoidably unsafe” products, because drug side effects are a 
“known, but apparently reasonable risk.”
206  However, in order to qualify for this exception the 
drugs must be accompanied by “proper directions and warning.”
207  Strict liability applies only to 
“unreasonably” dangerous products,
208 and a product is not unreasonably dangerous if it has 
known risk that renders it unavoidably unsafe, provided the manufacturer warns the buyer of the 
risks.   The warning must include notice of all dangers that the manufacturer knows of, or should 
know, based on “the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight.”
209   
  If drug companies were to conduct reliable premarket clinical research in pregnant 
women, they would know of the drug’s risks and include them in the drugs’ warning, which 
would insulate the manufacturers from liability.
210  Without conducting research of their own, 
drug companies run a significant risk being held strictly liable for any injury that ensues because 
a court could find that the manufacturer should have known of the risk in light of the present 
state of “reasonable developed human skill and foresight.”  This standard is essentially the same 
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as a negligence standard; thus failure-to-warn lawsuits can be brought under either a strict 
liability theory, negligence doctrine, or both.
211   
  A minority of jurisdictions have no scienter requirement and hold the manufacturer 
simply liable for failure to warn of the specific risks to pregnant women, even if there is no proof 
the manufacturer should have known of the risks.
212 For those jurisdictions, the only way a 
manufacturer can warn of a pregnancy risk and avoid liability is to discover it through testing. 
  For the jurisdictions that only impose liability for failure to warn where a defendant 
should have known of a risk, clinical testing still may be necessary to avoid liability.  In one 
case, a court allowed the question of liability to go to the jury where a manufacturer failed to 
conduct animal studies on a possible correlation between their drug and a retinal disorder after 
receiving anecdotal accounts from doctors that patients who had used the medicine subsequently 
developed the disorder.
213  The court held that a reasonable juror could conclude the 
manufacturer should have known of the risk and should have conducted studies that would 
enable them to adequately warn consumers of the risk.
214  The court reasoned: 
“Purchasers cannot try out drugs to determine whether they kill or cure . . . Where 
experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the degree of danger, the 
product must not be tried out on the public. . . . The claim that a hazard was not foreseen 
is not available to one who did not use foresight appropriate to his enterprise.”
215 
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  Following Hoffman, courts can hold manufacturers liable for failure to conduct studies to 
apprise themselves of the information necessary to adequately warn consumers about a drug’s 
risk of a specific harm.  Given that so many companies now have registries, they are likely to 
receive reports of adverse pregnancy outcomes from doctors or patients like those in Hoffman 
that would similarly give them notice to conduct a study and subject them to liability if they do 
not.   Even if a company does not receive such reports, the broad language in Hoffman suggests 
that they could be liable under the theory that “experiment or research” is always necessary to 
determine “the presence or the degree of danger” of teratogenic effects, and that a drug 
company’s failure to test for those risks displayed a lack of foresight.  As one commentator put 
it, “manufacturers will have a difficult time arguing that a drug is “unavoidably unsafe if they 
fail to test the drug in a population that might foreseeably use it.”
216 
  A company cannot escape liability by issuing a vague warning that their drug poses risks 
to a fetus and/or should not be used in pregnant women.  The adequacy of any warning is almost 
always a question of fact for a jury.
217  In order for a pharmaceutical company to obtain summary 
judgment and thereby avoid the significant expense of a trial the drug company must show that 
the warning was “clear and unambiguous” and the plaintiff’s injuries “are identical to those the 
warning described.”
218  A drug manufacturer cannot possibly achieve so specific a warning 
unless they are fully aware of the exact nature of a drug’s risks.  Nor can a company rely on FDA 
approval of its warning language to prove that its warning was adequate.
219   
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  There is even some precedent that failure to conduct additional drug testing needed to 
adequately warn consumers can be the basis for punitive damages.
220  In that case, Wooderson v. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., independent post-market studies by third-party researchers 
suggested that that Ortho’s oral contraceptive carried risks of kidney damage and 
hypertension.
221  The court held that these independent studies should have conducted further 
research to “prove or disprove” the allegations in the studies.
222  This means that if third party 
researchers, pregnancy registries, or government-run studies indicate teratogenic effects in a drug 
after it has already been on the market, the drug company may be obligated to perform follow-up 
studies of its own.   
  This duty to test can be triggered by any scientific data of the type that is used by experts 
in the field: it need not be limited to proven clinical studies.
223  If such data exists and the 
manufacturer continues to sell the drug, the burden is on the manufacturer to prove that the 
information was unavailable to them.
224  It could also be argued by analogy that if a company’s 
own preliminary toxicology testing reveals teratogenic potential, a manufacturer may have a duty 
to test the drug further to ascertain the existence and nature of the risk.
225   
  Hoffman dealt with the duty to conduct experimental tests as a subpart of the duty to 
warn.  The duty to warn itself requires even less of a trigger than the duty to test.  In Wells v. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. the court held that a drug manufacturer must issue a specific 
warning of a harmful birth defect “as soon as there was a hint of a possibility that the Product 
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causes birth defects.”
226  The duty to warn in that case was held to be triggered at even though no 
published studies had indicated birth defects.
227  Two unpublished studies had suggested the 
possibility of a link between spermicides generally and birth defects.
 228  The court concluded 
these studies were a sufficient basis for a jury to conclude that the manufacturer should have 
known of a risk of birth defects, and consequently should warned the public of those defects.
229 
  It is possible a drug company responding to this tort regime will still wish to wait to 
conduct the studies until third party warnings trigger the need to conduct further testing in 
pregnant women.  They may view the delay as favorable because it allows them to profit from 
selling the drug without specified warnings to pregnant women in the interim.  However, it is 
more likely that the delay would work against them.  Women who took the drug in the interim 
and had children with birth defects will be all the more tempted to sue if it appears the 
manufacturer intentionally turned a blind eye to the possibility of harm and waited to conduct the 
test until tort law explicitly required it of them.  Also, since a manufacturer is held to have the 
same constructive knowledge of the likelihood of risks as “an expert in the field,”
230 a plaintiff 
could argue that since the third party researcher later thought to study a particular suspected 
teratogenic effect in the drug, the manufacturer too should have known to suspect and test for 
that risk.  With the prospect of punitive damages, a sympathetic plaintiff, and the appearance of 
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intentional delay, it would be unwise for manufacturers to wait for a ‘red flag’ before they begin 
testing for teratogenicity.  
  Manufacturers may be concerned that the children of their test subjects will prevail in a 
tort suit based on injuries that occurred as a result of the clinical trial.  While there is very little 
case precedent on the subject, at least one court has held that a mother has an absolute right to 
consent on behalf of her fetus to experimental therapeutic medicine,
231 but there is no caselaw on 
the effect of maternal consent on liability for nontherapeutic fetal experimentation.
232  In the 
absence of direct precedent, commentators have speculated that informed consent by the mother 
would very likely preclude a tort suit against the drug manufacturer by the child, because the 
mother’s voluntary participation after informed consent would constitute an intervening cause 
that would make it impossible for the child to prove the manufacturer, rather than the mother, 
caused the child’s injuries.
233  Also, the manufacturer could liken maternal consent for fetal 
participation in a study to parental consent for children who are too young to meaningfully 
consent to participation in a study.  It is highly unlikely a child whose parents gave fully 
informed consent to enrollment in a study could successfully sue his or her researchers,
234 and it 
makes little sense for the industry to fear litigation from a fetus but not from a newborn.  Other 
scholars have pointed out that any claim by the offspring of research subjects would have to 
proceed on the assumption that an adult woman is not capable of properly weighing the benefits 
of the trial against the risks to the fetus despite being fully informed of this risks: the same 
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stereotypes that are condemned in the context of government regulation.
235  Finally, even if 
manufacturers could be held responsible for injuries to the offspring of their research subjects, it 
would still be less costly for manufacturers to conduct premarket clinical trials on a limited 
number of women than to market the drug to the general public and expose themselves to 
enormous potential liability from every pregnant women in the country who takes the drug.
236  
  In sum, I contend that despite manufacturers’ vague assertions that that the prospect of 
tort liability precludes clinical testing in pregnant woman, the existing tort case law actually 
indicates that clinical tests will reduce manufacturers’ potential liability in tort.  By apprising 
themselves of the risks of drug use in pregnant women, drug manufacturers can provide 
warnings of this risk and immunize themselves against the threat of liability.  I am further 
incredulous about drug companies claims about litigation fears, because they already face the 
risk of litigation from expose fertile men to male teratogens that can cause birth defects in 
children conceived while men were exposed to the drug.
237  Notably, in the context of birth 
defects caused by workplace exposure to teratogens, more men than women have filed lawsuits 
against their employers.
238   
  One could ask why manufacturers protest so strongly if conducting clinical research 
would not increase their tort liability.  One possible answer is that they may lack a detailed 
understanding of tort law.  Another answer is that it is economically beneficial for drug 
manufacturers to exclude pregnant women from clinical trials. If manufacturers had to begin 
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conducting research with pregnant subjects to obtain FDA approval, they would need to go 
through the added expense of tracking down and recruiting pregnant volunteers, producing extra 
quantities of the drug for those volunteers, compensating them for their participation and for any 
medical procedures that become necessary as a result of the drug trial, and maintaining operating 
costs for the nine or more months they must wait before they can obtain results from the trial.  
Also, since pregnant women respond differently to medication in terms of dosage, data from 
their participation in the trial cannot be compared with data from nonpregnant study populations, 
and the drug manufacturer will essentially have to conduct two separate full clinical trials to 
accommodate for the differences inherent in the pregnant group.  Indeed, it is a basic precept 
among the scientific communicate that increasing homogeneity among test subjects allows you 
to decrease the size, and therefore cost of a clinical trial by reducing the number of variables that 
could affect trial outcomes.
239  Pregnancy increases variables among the clinical trial population 
that can influence a drug’s effects and necessitates a larger pool of subjects.  These extensive, 
inevitable costs of pregnancy testing are likely a far stronger deterrent drug companies than the 
vague, uncertain costs of potential litigation.  Litigation threat is a convenient scapegoat for drug 
companies to give as the reason for why they do not test drugs in pregnant women; it is far easier 
for drug companies to blame unscrupulous plaintiffs’ lawyers than to blame their own 
unwillingness to undertake the costs necessary to ensure that drugs commonly used by pregnant 
women are safe and effective. 
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V.  Regulatory Solutions to the Lack of Pregnant Women’s Participation in Clinical Research 
A.  Gov’t funded studies and patent extension   
  One potential solution to pregnant women’s inadequate access to clinical drug trials could 
be for the government to financially subsidize those trials, either through direct funding or 
through extensions of patent terms that give increased revenue to researchers to offset the 
increased cost of testing on the pregnant female subpopulation.   
  This approach was implemented by Congress to improve clinical trial research for 
another underrepresented subpopulation: children.  Legislators implemented this approach 
through three successive statutes: the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 
(FDAMA), the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) and the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007(FDAAA).  These statutes and the FDA rules made 
pursuant to them created financial incentives by offering six month patent extension as a reward 
for pediatric testing,
240 and government financing of third party research.
241  Another form of 
government subsidy of clinical trials occurs through direct research conducted by government 
employees.  The FDA has already begun to implement this strategy.  In 2002, the FDA made 
research grants to two universities to determine the appropriate dosage level for two 
hypertension drugs, labetolol and atenolol in pregnant women.
242 
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  Much has been said of the success of these financial incentives.  One FDA spokesperson 
declared that the “pediatric exclusivity provision has done more to generate clinical studies and 
useful prescribing information for the pediatric population than any other regulatory or 
legislative process to date.”
243   
  Much has also been said of their shortcomings.  Patent extensions have been criticized for 
failing to provide any incentive for research on drugs whose patents have expired by are still 
routinely used by groups for which there is no adequate clinical data.
244  They similarly present 
little or no advantage to drug companies whose products have an active patent, but who 
nonetheless lack market exclusivity because of fierce competition from rival drugs.   
  The government subsidy provisions in the BPCA attempted to remedy some of these 
problems by allowing the government to pay for pediatric research manufacturers refuse to 
conduct, but government funding of research is also problematic.  An average clinical trial costs 
an average of $3.87 million to conduct, and for the year 2002 alone Congress appropriated $200 
million to carry out the subsidy option in the BOCA.
245  When the research is conducted by NIH 
or other government researchers, the trials also costs the government personnel, building space, 
and other limited resources that could be spent on innumerable other research opportunities.  
While a private pharmaceutical company at least has the possibility of recouping its investment 
in research by gaining better access to the submarket of pregnant women, the government has no 
such opportunity to cover its losses.  The result is that the government may prioritize only those 
medications that it deems the most necessary for women or the fetus’ health.  Ironically these 
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may be the medicines for which scientific information is the least valuable to pregnant women, 
because a woman who truly needs medicine is more likely to take it even if the data shows it 
produces birth defects, and so teratogenicity is less likely to be a determinate factor in her 
decisionmaking as it would be for a medicine that is highly beneficial but not lifesaving.    
  A financial-incentives approach works best if the reasons for the industry’s lack of testing 
are exclusively financial. Pediatric studies can increase costs to drug manufacturers because it 
may be difficult, and therefore expensive, to recruit children because of a general reluctance by 
concerned parents to subject their children to risks.  Another financial obstacle to pediatric 
research is a fear of lawsuits.  The industry could believe that lawsuits are likely to be more 
frequent because parents might be overly reactionary when their children have an adverse side 
effect, and because children might disagree with their parents’ choice to enroll them in the study 
and sue on their own behalf when they reach the age of maturity.  Jury verdicts are also likely to 
be enhanced by the sympathetic nature of a child victim who could not meaningfully consent to 
the procedure, and by the fact that a child with lifelong industries needs more years of 
compensation than an adult.  Where such financial impediments restrict children’s access to drug 
trials, providing a financial subsidy seems an appropriate solution.   
  Many of these rationales apply to pregnant women.  However, there are also nonfinancial 
reasons that pregnant women are excluded from trials that would not be resolved by a financial 
incentive.  One such barrier could be the increased time it takes to conduct pregnancy studies, 
because a great deal of follow-up is needed to spot teratogenic effects that are not immediately 
apparent in the womb or even at birth.  Financial incentives also do not address the regulatory 
barriers in place that prohibit some kinds of research on pregnant women and deter others.  Nor 
do they address biases or concerns held by individual researchers, such as the desire for 74 
 
homogeneity in the subject class, beliefs that pregnancy is an atypical state compared to the 
male-normative ideal, and therefore an unimportant field to research.  Another bias could come 
from researchers’ subjective disapproval of pregnant women who fail to conform to expected 
roles by putting their fetuses at risk.  Given the strong historical backdrop of fetal protectionism 
and fears of maternal-fetal conflicts, money may not be enough to incentivize research. 
B.  FDA Labeling Requirements 
  In 2008, the FDA proposed a significant change to its requirements for pregnancy-related 
drug labeling.
246  This proposed rule would have required drug companies to include a 
“Pregnancy” subsection on their label, which would include: (1) information about any existing 
pregnancy registries for the drug, (2) a “fetal risk summary” that includes a conclusion about the 
drug’s likelihood of risk (such as “high likelihood of increased risk”) or a statement that there is 
insufficient data, (3) a narrative statement describing in detail any particular risks that are known, 
and (4) a “clinical considerations” sections that includes additional information on dosing.
247  
Notice of the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register, and comments were received 
until August 27, 2008,
248 but no final rule has issued since the comment period terminated. 
  While the FDA’s rulemaking is admirable in that it attempts to increase pregnant 
women’s access to information, the comments to the rule illustrate its fundamental flaw; drug 
manufacturers cannot provide women with detailed information on the drug label if that detailed 
information is not known to drug manufacturers.  Several comments observed that given the 
present inadequate state of knowledge about the pregnancy safety of most medications, drug 
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companies would have no legitimate basis for asserting that a drug has a high, low or moderate 
likelihood of increased risk to the fetus.
249  One comment explained that under the regulation, 
data from pregnancy registries could be used by drug companies as a basis for making a 
conclusion about risk, and that those conclusions could be misleading because registries conflate 
data from women exposed to different doses at different times in their pregnancies, often have 
too few numbers of participants, and have too little follow-up to account for external factors that 
could affect the fetus.
250  In other words, the new labeling requirements would not incentivize 
drug companies to do more and better premarket research, it would only make them report the 
existing, poor quality research that may even more be unhelpful and even misleading to pregnant 
women than no information at all.
251  The information presented may be all the more confusing 
to prescribers and patients because of the fact that there is no standardized type of data that drug 
companies will use to base their conclusions on.  Some may use animal studies, while others 
might use postmarket registries, and within those subgroups the methods, size of the research 
population, species of animal, and many other variables may further reduce standardization.
252  
Thus one company’s idea of “low risk” may differ considerably from another company’s idea of 
“low risk” and so on. 
  Although labeling is a valuable tool in most circumstances, it is only as valuable as the 
information used by drug companies to write their labels.  Labeling alone is incapable of 
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resolving the problem pregnant woman’s lack of access to drug safety information, because there 
is not enough reliable scientific clinical data for drug manufacturers to base their labels on.  
C.  Regulatory Requirement 
  On final method of achieving greater participation by pregnant women in research is for 
the government to require it.  To that end, the National Institutes of Health’s policies regarding 
the inclusion of women in clinical research serve as a useful comparison.  The NIH 
Revitalization Act of 1993 set certain criteria for the NIH to implement through guidelines with 
the aim of increasing the proportion of women and minorities in clinical research.
253  The statute 
requires that the NIH “ensure that . . . women are included as subjects” in clinical research
254 in a 
manner that is adequate to reveal any differences in how the drug or other medical treatment 
affects men and women.
255  The statute allows for exceptions to this blanket rule if there is 
“substantial scientific data” demonstrating that there is no difference between men and women 
with respect to the variable being studied,
256 or if women’s inclusion is “inappropriate” because 
of the women’s health, the purpose of the research, or other circumstances that the director of 
NIH can designate.
257  Notably, the statute forbids the financial cost of including women from 
being a considered as part of the determination of whether it is appropriate to include women in 
any given clinical trial.
258  The latest NIH guidelines implementing this statute make clear that 
the burden for excluding women is a high one; women must be included in all NIH-funded 
                                                 
253 NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2 (2006)). 
254 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2(a)(1)(A), (d). 
255 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2(c). 
256 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2(d)(B). 
257 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2(b). 
258 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2(d)(A)(i). 77 
 
research unless there is a “clear and compelling” rationale for why their inclusion is 
inappropriate.
259 
  This statute can serve as a valuable model for mandatory pregnancy testing.  It would 
shift the burden under the regulatory regime from a presumption that research is forbidden unless 
the researcher can prove the study meets an exception, to a system in which research is required 
unless a drug company can prove they are exempt.  Instead of facing the hurdle under the DHHS 
rules of proving that a has minimal risk to the fetus or direct benefit to the mother before any 
data is available to corroborate such claims, a researcher would be able to proceed with 
pregnancy studies without fear of running afoul of government regulations. 
  Some could argue that a pregnant woman is different from other women for whom 
inclusion in research is required, because the pregnant woman is composed of two research 
subjects: herself and the fetus.  However, this alone cannot justify excluding a pregnant woman 
from research, since the government has seen fit to give both women (aka the mother) and 
children (aka the fetus) access to clinical trials.  If both adult women and children must be 
allowed access to research when they are in two separate bodies, it makes little sense to prohibit 
their participation in research when they are in one body.   
CONCLUSION 
  When I begin conversations with others about the topic of this paper, their initial reaction 
is usually one of surprise and incredulity.  Many have asked, “But how could you ever get 
pregnant women to take experimental drugs?”  I believe that the FDA, DHHS, and 
pharmaceutical industry also wonder the same thing, given the historical fears that stemmed from 
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the Thalidomide and DES disasters, and the widespread overestimation of the risk of fetal drug 
use.  Yet this history is not longer a reality.  It has now become commonplace for large numbers 
of pregnant women to take medications during pregnancy for chronic conditions, mental health 
problems, pregnancy-induced or exacerbated diseases, and even for preventative care like the 
H1N1 vaccine.  If women had the information they need to properly assess the risks and benefits 
of their medications, this increased use would only be a good thing.  Forgoing drug treatment for 
medical conditions during pregnancy can cause a mother unnecessary stress, suffering, damage 
to her health, and effects on the fetus that can be far more severe than those from the medication.  
But without the information to make an informed decision about medication use during 
pregnancy, women are left adrift, forced to experiment on their own instead of in a controlled, 
monitored research setting.  For these reasons I contend that the existing DHHS regulations are 
unduly prohibitive, and as a result pregnant women should be given the same access to clinical 
research participation as their nonpregnant counterparts. 
 
 